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Abstract
The first essay tests whether the returns to education are different between entrepreneurs
and regular employees. If the signaling model of education is correct, entrepreneurs should
receive lower returns from education (relative to employees) because they have no need
to signal their productivity to an employer. However, this result should only hold if the
researcher is able to control for selection into self-employment and the endogeneity of ed-
ucation. This is illustrated using a stylized model of signaling. The relationship between
self-employment and the returns to education is tested using data from the 1996 Survey
of Income and Program Participation. This rich panel dataset makes it possible to control
for many business-specific characteristics, like business equity, that have been previously
unaccounted for in the literature. Ordinary least squares regressions find the correlation
between education and earnings to be weaker for entrepreneurs. To control for selection,
I utilize a Heckman selection model using spousal health insurance and housing equity as
instruments. It shows that selection biases downward the correlation between education
and income for entrepreneurs. Finally, a fixed effects model is employed to control for any
time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. This approach indicates that education is as valu-
able, if not more valuable, to entrepreneurs as it is to employees. This does not support the
signaling hypothesis. The finding is robust to different measures of entrepreneurial earnings.
The second essay explores whether unemployed workers make successful transitions into
self-employment. It is well established that unemployed workers are more likely to transition
into self-employment than individuals coming from paid employment. A growing body of
literature suggests that these formerly unemployed entrants tend to exit self-employment
earlier than typical entrants. It is tempting to attribute this result to differences in ability
between the two groups. However, using an adapted version of Frank (1988)’s Intertemporal
Model of Industrial Exit, I show that this is not the case. In this model, entrants to self-
employment receive noisy information about their true entrepreneurial ability from their
earnings in the market. I show that low ability entrants to entrepreneurship should be no
more likely to exit self-employment than high ability entrants to self-employment. This is
because although low ability entrants will earn less as entrepreneurs, their outside wage in
paid employment will also be proportionately lower. Survival in self-employment, therefore,
is a function of how initial expectations match reality. This leads me to suggest that the
high exit rates out of self-employment for the formerly unemployed may be because this
group systematically overestimates their entrepreneurial ability at entry. This hypothesis
is justified by evidence from the psychology literature that low ability individuals tend to
overestimate their performance. Duration analysis on data from the 1996 and 2001 panels
of the Survey of Income and Program Participation confirms that the formerly unemployed
are more likely to exit self-employment. I also find preliminary evidence consistent with the
hypothesis that the unemployed overestimate their likelihood of success in self-employment.
These findings should give policymakers pause before incentivicing the unemployed to enter
self-employment.
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Chapter 1
The Returns to Education for
Entrepreneurs
1.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship receives a lot of attention. Politicians tout small businesses as the driving
force of job creation. The media glamorize technological start-ups and their young founders.
Hollywood profiles their lives. And, economists generally agree that entrepreneurs contribute
to innovation, create jobs, and increase productivity (Van Praag and Versloot, 2008). Many
economics textbooks even include entrepreneurship as a factor of production along with
labor, capital and land. But, for all its prominence, entrepreneurship is poorly understood
and, until recently, has been largely neglected in the economics literature (Parker, 2004).
Labor market surveys often fail to collect detailed information about the self-employed. The
data that is collected is often ignored by labor economists studying typical workers. This is
because the self-employed only represent a fraction of the population and cannot be easily
compared to employees. Their earnings and hours are not only highly volatile, but subject
to measurement error.
In fact, there is even disagreement within the field as to who should be considered
an entrepreneur. Entrepreneurship is often associated with bringing new innovations to
market. Such creativity often originates from small businesses. Thus, entrepreneurship is
loosely used to describe anyone who is self-employed. Critics argue that this is a mistake
1
as it includes many small businesses like dentists and taxi drivers that are not especially
innovative. As it is impossible to measure the “innovativeness” of a business, this paper
adopts the more rudimentary definition of an entrepreneur as someone who is self-employed
and uses the two terms interchangeably. The self-employed are of interest, even if they are
not particularly innovative, because they have complete autonomy from an employer. This
makes it possible to draw interesting inferences by comparing the self-employed to regular
employees.
1.1.1 Motivation
This paper compares the returns to education for entrepreneurs to those for employees.
The motivation for this topic is twofold. First, measuring the returns to education for
entrepreneurs is important in its own right. There is serious public skepticism as to the
value of education for entrepreneurs. In 2011, billionaire Paypal cofounder Peter Thiel
founded a fellowship program that awarded twenty 100,000 dollar awards to 20 aspiring
entrepreneurs under the age of 20. But the money came with a catch. These young award
recipients were required to drop out of school for at least two years while they pursued their
entrepreneurial venture.1 The media often highlight anecdotal evidence to suggest that
education is not as important for entrepreneurs. This narrative is aided by stories of college
dropouts like Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, and Mark Zuckerberg who went on to start wildly
successful businesses. This study will help determine whether education is as good of an
investment for entrepreneurs as it is for employees. This is important not only for prospective
entrepreneurs, but policymakers as well. Given its connection to innovation and job growth,
governments routinely encourage self-employment. For example, the United States’ Small
Business Administration provides counseling and subsidized loans for small businesses and
entrepreneurs. A better understanding of the returns to education for entrepreneurs will
allow governments to more efficiently promote entrepreneurship through public policy.
Secondly, comparing the returns to education of entrepreneurs and employees may pro-
1More information about the fellowship is available at http://www.thielfoundation.org/.
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vide broader insights into the value of education. There are two models in the literature
that explain the returns to education. The human capital model developed by Becker (1975)
and Mincer (1974) indicates that returns to education accrue from developing human capital
that makes a worker more productive. The signaling model introduced by Spence (1973)
indicates that education can be valuable even if it does not affect productivity as it may pro-
vide information to employers about the unobservable characteristics of employees. Since,
education is more costly for people of lower ability, a higher level of education is a signal to
employers that a person is intelligent, hardworking, perseverant, or intellectually curious.
Employees should enjoy returns from both human capital and signaling. But, as first noted
by Wolpin (1977), entrepreneurs should only reap the benefits from human capital as they
do not need to signal to an employer. Therefore, if the signaling model is true, the returns
to education for entrepreneurs should be lower than those for employees.
1.1.2 Current Literature
In order to compare employees to entrepreneurs, it is important to understand the charac-
teristics and motivations of the self-employed. There is a large consensus in the literature
that the self-employed earn less than employees of comparable quality. Entrepreneurs have
both lower initial earnings and lower earnings growth resulting in a 35 percent median pay
differential after 10 years (Hamilton, 2000). Many researchers attribute this to the non-
pecuniary benefits of being your own boss. This is supported by many studies that find the
self-employed are happier than employees even after controlling for job and personal char-
acteristics (Parker, 2004). Therefore, people with a preference for autonomy may self-select
into entrepreneurship. If choices about education and entrepreneurial entry are made jointly,
it becomes quite difficult to compare the returns to education between the two groups.
A subset of the entrepreneurship literature has examined the returns to education for
entrepreneurs. A meta-analysis of over 100 studies by Van der Sluis, Van Praag and Vi-
jverberg (2008) finds that the returns to education for entrepreneurs are estimated to be
3
6.1 percent per year of schooling. This is somewhat lower than estimates for the returns to
education in general. Of the 20 studies specifically examining the returns to education, the
results were more mixed. U.S. studies tend to find that the returns to education are higher
for entrepreneurs while European studies tend to find the returns to education are higher for
employees. However, most of these studies are plagued with three common shortcomings:
they fail to account for the endogeneity of education, ignore selection into entrepreneurship,
and inappropriately measure the income of entrepreneurs. A few papers have attempted to
credibly deal with some of these issues. Van der Sluis, Van Praag and Vijverberg (2009) use
panel data from the 1979 NLSY2 which provides them with controls on ability and family
background instruments for education. Contrary to the signaling theory, they find that the
returns to education for entrepreneurs are higher than for employees. Heywood and Wei
(2004) study entrepreneurs in Hong Kong and correct for selection into entrepreneurship.
They find the returns to education are significantly smaller for the self-employed. Brown and
Sessions (1998) use Italian data and a bivariate selection model. They find evidence that
the self-employed receive lower returns to education. This paper joins the former papers in
an effort to credibly measure the returns to education for the self-employed by addressing
these issues.
The signaling and human capital literature is extensive and there is still disagreement as
to the role each plays in the returns to education. And yet, the question is of great impor-
tance. Economists typically consider education to convey positive externalities to society
and thus have a social value that exceeds its private value. This implies that education is
underproduced and should be subsidized. In contrast, if people acquire an inefficiently high
level of education in order to signal their productivity, education is overproduced relative
to what is socially optimal.3 The debate is difficult to resolve because both theories yield
the same empirical prediction: higher educated people should earn higher wages. Some
2The National Longitudinal Study of Youth follows people from 1979 annually and later biennially to
present.
3 Spence (2002) shows that in the presence of inefficient signaling, social welfare can be improved by
taxing education.
4
researchers suggest that accurately controlling for ability is sufficient to show that the re-
turns to education are driven by human capital accumulation. But, as long as firms do not
know the ability of prospective workers, the signaling model predicts that the education
coefficient will capture the inferences firms make from education about worker productiv-
ity (Weiss, 1995). Thus, economists have resorted to comparing screened and unscreened
groups to evaluate the two schooling theories.
Wolpin (1977) spearheads this approach by predicting that if the signaling model is cor-
rect, education should be less valuable for people who are self-employed. Thus, he compares
the education levels of paid workers and the self-employed. Contrary to the signaling theory,
he finds that workers in the two groups obtained roughly the same amount of schooling.
A slightly different approach is taken by Riley (1979). He notes that signaling should be
much more important in sectors of the economy where worker productivity cannot be easily
observed. In these screened sectors of the economy he predicts, and finds, that the lifetime
earnings of the self-employed should be higher since they do not have to waste resources
signaling their productivity. This paper explores the idea that if education is largely prede-
termined prior to the self-employment decision, the relevant question becomes whether the
returns to education are higher or lower for the self-employed.
1.2 Theory
This paper tests for evidence of job market signaling by comparing the returns to education
of entrepreneurs and employees.4 The theoretical basis for this paper can be stated quite
simply. Entrepreneurs are an unscreened5 group because, since they are self-employed, they
have no need to signal their ability to an employer. Employees, on the other hand, are
4I am indebted to Dr. Philippe Belley for challenging and helping me to think more deeply about the
theoretical predictions in this paper. Any mistakes are my own.
5It is worth noting the differences between signaling and screening. Signaling is an effort by the party
that is privy to private information (employees) to convey that information to an uninformed third party
(employers). Screening is the use of this information by employers to make inferences about the unobservable
characteristics of employees.
5
a screened group and must signal their productivity to employers. Therefore, education
is valuable to employees because it both improves human capital and acts as a signal of
unobservable characteristics. In contrast, education is only valuable to entrepreneurs as a
source of human capital. Since both groups enjoy the human capital benefits of education,
but only employees get the signaling benefits, the signaling model predicts that employees
should receive higher returns from education than entrepreneurs. If the signaling model of
education is incorrect, there should be no difference in the returns to education between the
two groups. These theoretical predictions have been accepted in the literature as the logical
extension of Wolpin (1977) to the returns to education. However, I show that the returns to
education should only be lower for entrepreneurs if unobservable individual characteristics
are held constant and signaling is imperfect.
To illustrate these points, I utilize a stylized model. Many of the seminal papers on
signaling (Spence, 1973, Riley, 1979) show that signaling can explain the returns to education
even if education has no effect on human capital accumulation. However, this does not imply
that signaling and human capital are mutually exclusive. Education can both augment
human capital and provide value as a signal. Spence (2002) presents a parsimonious two-
group model where education both enhances human capital and serves as a signal. This
model, found in Section II of Spence (2002), is as follows: Let there be two types of workers, i
= 1,2; E is the education chosen by each worker; si(E) is the value of each worker; s
′
i(E) > 0
and s
′′
i (E) < 0; ci(E) is the cost of education for each worker; c
′
i(E) > 0 and c
′′
i (E) > 0;
s2(E) > s1(E); c1(E) > c2(E).
Workers in group 1 are of a lower ability than workers in group 2 and have a higher cost
of acquiring education. For both groups, si(E) is a concave function and ci(E) is a convex
function. Employers do not know to which group a potential employee belongs. However,
since individuals in group 2 have lower costs of education, they will consume higher levels of
education. Therefore, employers can use education to screen for ability. Workers in group
1 have an incentive to acquire extra education to imitate high ability group 2 workers.
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However, since the costs of acquiring education are higher for group 1, in a separating
equilibrium6, group 2 workers will choose a level of education that is prohibitively costly for
group 1 to obtain. The dynamics of this model can bee seen in Figure 3 of Spence (2002).
In this model, each worker maximizes the net return of education: si(E) - ci(E). How-
ever, as researchers, we are largely unable to measure the costs of education. Instead, we
only see the amount of education a worker has acquired and the wages they receive in the
labor market. Figure 1.1 illustrates the relationship, implied by Spence (2002)’s model, that
should exist between E and si(E). The returns to education are captured by the slope of
any line segment.
Figure 1.1: Returns to Education Under Signaling
E∗1 is the optimal amount of education that group 1 workers will choose so that s1(E) -
c1(E) is maximized. E is the optimal amount of education that group 2 workers will choose
such that it is not in the interest of group 1 workers to imitate them.7 The slope of cb
captures the returns to education for an employee who increases his education from E∗1 to
6A pooling equilibrium is possible if the fraction of the population in group 1 is sufficiently small.
However, as this paper is testing for the presence of signaling, attention is restricted to the separating
equilibrium.
7E∗
2
, the optimal amount of education for group 2 in the absence of signaling, is less than E if signaling
is inefficient.
7
E. These returns are composed of two parts: 1) the employer now believes the worker is of
higher ability and 2) the employer treats the increase in education as enhancing the human
capital of a high ability worker. It should be noted that both group 1 and group 2 workers
would get the same returns from this increase in education. However, it would only be a
utility improving choice for group 2 because their education costs are sufficiently low. An
entrepreneur increasing his education from E∗1 to E would enjoy returns to education equal
to the slope of ab if he is a high ability worker and the slope of cd if he is a low ability
worker. The returns to education for entrepreneurs are lower because they are not receiving
a signaling benefit from education.
However, a researcher cannot typically identify the ability of individuals. The researcher
simply sees workers’ education choices. Therefore, while the model predicts the returns to
education should be lower for entrepreneurs, this does not imply that the simple correlation
between education and income should be smaller for the self-employed.
Reconsider the original model where signaling is perfect. The crucial point is that em-
ployees are paid their marginal product. The correlation between education and earnings for
employees is the slope of cb. This captures that highly educated employees have high innate
ability which is recognized and rewarded by employers (signaling). Moreover, employers
compensate workers for the impact education has on enhancing human capital.
Similarly, a researcher studying entrepreneurs is unable to discern the ability of individ-
uals and therefore has the same perspective as an employer. Highly educated entrepreneurs
have high innate ability and entrepreneurs with little education have low ability. Therefore,
the correlation between education and earnings for entrepreneurs is also the slope of cb. In
other words, even though entrepreneurs do not receive the signaling benefits of education
via an employer, from the researcher’s perspective, educated entrepreneurs are also of higher
ability and can be thought of as getting the “signaling” reward from the market. Therefore
the correlation between education and earnings should be the same for entrepreneurs and
employees. Intuitively, if the correlation between education and entrepreneurial earnings
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captures the true value of education, rational employers must reward education similarly.
This result is not conditional on perfect signaling. Suppose that education is an im-
perfect signal. Perhaps education is only 90 percent correlated with ability instead of 100
percent correlated with ability. Then, employees would receive less signaling value from their
education. Similarly, researchers of entrepreneurs would see a weaker relationship between
education and earnings as some high ability entrepreneurs would not get an education and
do abnormally well.8 In both cases, the correlation between education and earnings would
fall equally. An example where education is an imperfect signal is illustrated in Figure 1.2
where the correlation between education and earnings is denoted by the slope of ef .
In fact, the model’s predictions only hold when signaling is imperfect. If signaling is per-
fect, all type 1 individuals will acquire E∗1 and all type 2 individuals will acquire E. Both
employees and entrepreneurs will be paid exactly their marginal product. If signaling per-
fectly captures differences in ability, after the researcher controls for ability, there will be no
remaining signaling value of education. In contrast, when signaling is imperfect, employers
will make inferences about ability from education that are correct on average for the popu-
lation, but incorrect for those individuals who face barriers to acquiring education. If these
individuals are employees, from the employer’s perspective there is a very high probability
they are of low ability and they will be paid less than their marginal product. However, if
these individuals are entrepreneurs, they will be paid their true marginal product.
This raises the point that individuals who face barriers to acquiring education may
have an incentive to transition into self-employment where the market will pay them their
marginal product. To explore the impact of this type of selection more formally, consider
the following exercise.
Suppose that there are 400 workers: 200 are self-employed and 200 are employees. In
each group, 100 workers are high ability and 100 workers are low ability.9 Suppose, that
8It is also possible that some low ability individuals would get so much education as to appear to be
high ability. The effect on the returns to education would be identical. This seems less likely in equilibrium
since the cost of acquiring education must be high enough to make it irrational for low ability copycats.
9For simplicity, the self-employed make up half of the population. The effects of selection will actually
9
there are barriers to signaling that prevent 25 percent of high ability workers from signaling
via education. For example, maybe some high ability students face credit constraints on
college financing. This will cause education to be a weaker signal of ability. Individuals with
E∗1 are of low ability with probability .8 and high ability with probability .2.
10 Individuals
with E are high ability with probability 1.0, but fewer individuals will now accumulate E.
The result is that low ability workers with little education will be paid more than their
marginal product and high ability workers with little education will be paid less than their
marginal product. This is illustrated in Figure 1.2 where e is above the marginal product
of a low ability worker but below the marginal product of a high ability worker.
Figure 1.2: Correlation between Education and Earnings under Imperfect Signaling
If self-employment allows a worker to receive his true marginal product, then high
ability workers with little education will have a financial incentive to transition into self-
employment. If all high ability, low education workers transition into self-employment the
result is as illustrated in Figure 1.3. For employees, education becomes a perfect signal of
ability. The returns to education is the slope of line segment ij. However, self-employed
individuals with E1 are of low ability with probability 2/3 and high ability with probabil-
ity 1/3.11 Therefore, low education entrepreneurs have a higher average ability than low
be stronger if the self-employed make up a small fraction of the population as is the case empirically.
10125 workers in each group will now acquire E∗
1
. Of these, 25 will be high ability individuals.
11150 employees will now acquire E1. Of these, 50 will be high ability individuals.
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Figure 1.3: Imperfect Signaling and Selection
education employees. This reduces the correlation between education and earnings for en-
trepreneurs. The correlation between education and earnings for entrepreneurs is the slope
of gh. From the researcher’s perspective, the correlation between education and income
should be much smaller for entrepreneurs than for employees. The extent to which this
happens depends on the transferability of skills from paid to self-employment, the cost of
switching to self-employment, and the knowledge and foresight of workers. An indication of
this type of selection is that entrepreneurs should have lower levels of education.
In summary, in the presence of signaling entrepreneurs should earn lower returns from
education only under certain conditions. First, the researcher must control for differences
in ability caused by the endogenous nature of education. Otherwise, there is no reason the
researcher should find the correlation between education and earnings to differ between the
self-employed and employees. Second, barriers to signaling must exist which make education
an accurate proxy of ability on average, but not for every individual. Finally, selection into
self-employment by individuals unable to signal offers an alternative explanation for why
entrepreneurs might see lower returns to their education. Therefore, in order to make
inferences about signaling, it is necessary to control for possible unobservable heterogeneity
caused by selection.
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1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Key Assumptions
The theoretical predictions depend on two additional assumptions: entrepreneurs do not use
education as a signal and education is predetermined prior to the self-employment decision.
Therefore, it is worth discussing these assumptions in greater detail.
The first assumption is based on the simple fact that the self-employed do not need to
signal to an employer. However, education may be useful to the self-employed as a signal
to creditors, investors, employees or customers. While this is a fair criticism, I argue that
these alternative signaling avenues are relatively small. Small businesses are not financed
only through bank loans. Instead entrepreneurs utilize credit cards, personal assets and
loans from family and friends. In fact, many entrepreneurs report problems getting credit
from a bank. This is likely caused by adverse selection in the loanable funds market. Banks
have little information about the riskiness of new businesses. However, if they charge higher
interest rates to compensate for this uncertainty only the riskiest businesses will be willing
to borrow exacerbating the adverse selection problem. So, banks respond by rationing credit
as described by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Assessing the risk of an individual loan is costly
and banks are most likely to screen using metrics such as business income, credit history
and collateral. In surveys, entrepreneurs report that a poor personal credit history and
insufficient collateral are the most common reasons their loan applications are denied (Robb
et al., 2008). Furthermore, an empirical study of U.S. small business owners in 1998 found
no statistically significant relationship between education and loan approval (Vos et al.,
2007). Investors may also screen on the basis of education. However, only 31.2 percent
of the entrepreneurs in the SIPP are incorporated, a requirement for investment. And,
investment is most common after a business has a track record, a much more informative
signal than education. It is also possible that entrepreneurs must signal to customers in
some industries. For example, customers may inquire about the education of an accountant
or consultant. In addition, doctors and lawyers are required by law to attain a certain level
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of education in order to practice. However, an employee must signal both to his employer
and to customers while an entrepreneur must only signal to customers. Finally, signaling to
customers is the exception rather than the rule. In most industries consumers purchase a
good or service with little knowledge or concern as to the education of the business owner.
While education may hold some signaling value for entrepreneurs, I find the evidence to
suggest that signaling is much more important for employees.
However, it is possible that education may play a unique role for entrepreneurs. Aldrich
and Zimmer (1986) argue that entrepreneurs are not isolated actors and that social networks
play a key role in their success. This seminal paper paved the way for a number of studies
that examined the effect of entrepreneurial networks on firm success. Social networks have
been credited with providing entrepreneurs market information, business advice, ideas, and
emotional support (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003). Of particular interest, entrepreneurs seek
legitimacy from social networks to reduce the implied risk to potential investors and em-
ployees. Cooper, Folta and Woo (1991) find some evidence that entrepreneurs with more
education are better able to increase their social networks. It is, therefore, possible that
education is valuable to entrepreneurs via social networks in ways that it is not valuable to
employees. However, this effect is indirect and difficult to quantify.
The second assumption is that education is predetermined prior to the self-employment
decision. If, on the contrary, children anticipate being entrepreneurs as adults they may
intentionally underinvest in education. This was the original prediction made by Wolpin
(1977). However, he finds the opposite result: entrepreneurs actually accumulate more ed-
ucation than employees. This finding is now well established in the literature. Similarly,
the very fact that people switch from regular employment to self-employment and back
again is inconsistent with a model where education choices are conditional on future self-
employment. Decisions to invest in high school and college education are made when an
individual is still an adolescent. It is unlikely, at this young age, that a student can predict
with any certainty whether he or she will be self-employed later in life. In fact, Blanchflower
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and Oswald (1998) find virtually no correlation between childhood psychological charac-
teristics and entry into self-employment as an adult.12 Moreover, a meta analysis of 20
studies done by Van der Sluis, Van Praag and Vijverberg (2008) finds that education level
has an insignificant effect on entry in 75 percent of the studies. The evidence suggests that
future entrepreneurs accumulate about the same level of education as future employees. It
may be that aspiring entrepreneurs either believe education is equally beneficial for the self-
employed or they are acquiring education for consumption purposes or as a hedge against
the risk of failing as an entrepreneur. The following sections explore selection and other
methodological issues in more detail.
1.3.2 Methodological Issues
Selection
The first difficulty in comparing the returns to education between entrepreneurs and em-
ployees is selection into self-employment. Selection exists if entrepreneurs are systematically
different from the type of people who choose to be employees. If people who are smarter,
more independent, more creative, more risk loving, or more ambitious are more likely to
become entrepreneurs, then the returns to education for entrepreneurs is capturing the
interactions between education and these unobserved variables. The selection problem is
reduced if personal characteristics like ability are observed in the data. But, unobserved
characteristics like creativity are impossible to control for. To date, the literature finds
little evidence of selection into entrepreneurship based on personal characteristics. Rather,
there is strong evidence that capital constraints are the primary barrier to entry into self-
employment. This is supported by evidence that individuals receiving an inheritance are
more likely to enter self-employment (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). The same authors
also find that capital constraints are the most common reason British survey respondents
report for not becoming self-employed. Similarly, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) find a strong
12The only correlation they find is a weak negative relationship between being anxious for acceptance as
a child and adult self-employment.
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relationship between family assets and entry into self-employment in NLSY data. Later, I
will utilize the impact of capital constraints on entry into self-employment to control for
selection issues.
Endogeneity of Education
Another complication when comparing the returns to education between the two groups
is the endogenous nature of the education. Education is endogenous because people with
higher ability are more likely to acquire schooling. Therefore, the correlation between edu-
cation and earnings is partially driven by unobservable differences between people who get
more schooling and those who do not. As described in the theory section, the predictions
of the theoretical model can only be tested if the researcher can control for differences in
ability due to education. Card (1999) summarizes the various approaches that have been
employed to estimate the causal effect of education on earnings. Most frequently, researchers
measure the causal value of education by utilizing instrumental variables that arise from in-
stitutional rules or natural variation. For example, changes in state compulsory schooling
laws and a student’s quarter of birth (which influences the amount of schooling required
before dropping out is allowed) have both been used as instruments. Similar instruments
include the distance to a college and unemployment at the time of graduation. This group of
instruments is often criticized for only being weakly correlated with education. Family char-
acteristics like parents’ education and number of siblings are more strongly correlated with
education. But, these potential instruments are problematic as they tend to be correlated
with earnings.
In this chapter, it is not ideal to correct for the endogeneity of education using instru-
mental variables. Finding strong instruments for education that are not correlated with
income is quite difficult. Moreover, an instrumental approach provides the causal impact of
education on those individuals who are compelled by the instrument to change their accu-
mulation of education. It is quite possible that the instrument might have a different effect
on the educational choices of employees than on the self-employed. Furthermore, the subset
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of individuals who are both self-employed and compelled to change their education based
on the instrument is likely too small to generate meaningful estimates.13 Instead, this paper
employs a fixed effects model to control for individual heterogeneity when comparing the
returns to education for employees and the self-employed.
1.3.3 Methodological Approach
Ordinary Least Squares
While my dataset, the SIPP14, is a panel dataset, I begin by pooling the data and running
an ordinary least squares regression. The coefficients will be biased if either education or
selection into self-employment are endogenous. However, an OLS regression will provide
insights beyond what is obvious from the summary statistics and act as a baseline that
can be compared against the fixed effects results. The earnings equation, based on Mincer
(1974), is as follows:
yit = β0 + Edu
′
iβ1 + (Edui ∗ Selfit)
′
β2 + β3Selfit + Controls
′
itβ4 + it (1.1)
where yit is log hourly wage of individual i at time t; Edui includes dummies for grad-
uating high school, attending some college, graduating college, and completing a graduate
degree; Selfit is a dummy for being self-employed, Edui ∗ Selfit is an interaction of self-
employment status and education dummies; Controlsit include age, age
2, business and job
tenure, percentage of time in the panel unemployed, regional dummies, incorporation of busi-
ness status, reasons given for switching between jobs, and the whether a person is switching
into or out of self-employment.
Heckman Selection Model
While OLS provides useful insights into the data, it only captures the correlation between
education and earnings. This relationship will be biased if individuals who select into self-
13This statement is based on my fruitless modeling of both education and self-employment as endogenous
variables where state unemployment at age 18 was used to instrument for education.
14Survey of Income and Program Participation.
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employment are systematically different from those who chose paid employment. Almost by
definition, entrepreneurs must be unique. Some unobserved characteristics must exist which
allow entrepreneurs to see needs in the market and which compel them to fills those needs.
To account for this, I employ a Heckman model to control for selection into entrepreneur-
ship (Heckman, 1979). Often, the Heckman model is used to account for potential workers
who decide not to work and therefore are not seen in the labor market data. In this case,
both employee and entrepreneur labor market data is available. But, most individuals are
only observed in one state: as either an entrepreneur or an employee. And, there are
reasons to treat self-employment wages and paid employment wages as distinct dependent
variables. It is quite possible that the factors that influence success in self-employment
are quite different from those that influence success in the traditional labor market. For
example, racial discrimination might have less of an effect on the self-employed if customers
have less of a taste for discrimination than employers. Moreover, some variables that af-
fect self-employment profit are not relevant for paid employees. Incorporation status and
business tenure are not relevant to paid workers. Therefore, it makes sense to run separate
regressions for entrepreneurs and employees and control for selection into the respective
groups. Selection is controlled by using a probit model to determine what factors influence
entry into self or paid employment. Identification of the Heckman model will be based on
distributional assumptions unless additional variables are included in the first stage, but
not the second stage. I employ two of these exclusion restrictions. The first, spousal insur-
ance, captures whether an individual obtains health insurance from a spouse or other family
member. It is well established that adverse selection in health insurance drives up the cost
of coverage for people trying to acquire independent policies. Therefore, it is not surprising
that less than 20 percent of small business owners get health insurance from their business.15
This makes entrepreneurship more attractive to individuals who are able to obtain health
insurance from their spouse (and consequently, paid employment is less attractive). The
15http://www.gallup.com/poll/101689/smallbusiness-owners-see-need-overhaul-us-healthcare.aspx
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second instrument, home equity, captures the amount of equity the family has built up in
their home. As explained earlier, there is strong evidence that capital constraints prevent
many workers from starting their own business. Therefore, all else equal, individuals with
more equity in their houses should be more likely to undertake an entrepreneurial venture.
The first stage probit estimation for each model is given by:
Prob(Self = 1|Z) = Φ(Z ′γself )
Prob(Employee = 1|Z) = Φ(Z ′γemp)
(1.2)
Where Z includes the original regressors, spousal insurance and log housing equity and Φ is
the normal cumulative distribution function.16
These first stage results are used to construct the inverse mills ratio λit = φ(Z
′γ)/Φ(Z ′γ)
where φ is the population density function. The inverse mills ratio is then plugged into the
regression to control for selection so the final estimated equation for each group is:
yselfit = β0 + Edu
′
iβ1 + β2λ
self
it + Controls
′
self,itβ3 + it
yemployeeit = α0 + Edu
′
iα1 + α2λ
employee
it + Controls
′
emp,itα3 + it
(1.3)
where Controls exclude education dummies, Controlsself contains entrepreneur specific
variables like incorporation status, yselfit is log hourly wage for the self-employed and y
emp
it is
the log hourly wage for paid employees.
Fixed Effects Model
While the Heckman model is an improvement over OLS, it does not control for the endogene-
ity of education. As described in the theory section, when education is endogenous, there
is no reason to expect the correlation between education and earnings to be lower for en-
trepreneurs. Therefore, I follow Van der Sluis, Van Praag and Vijverberg (2009) and employ
the fixed effects model. A fixed effects model eliminates both the selection and endogeneity
problem by holding unobservable individual effects constant. In the standard returns to
16State specific variables like business or job tenure and incorporation status are excluded because they
exist only when state = 1.
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education literature, fixed effects models are not used because education for typical workers
is determined prior to entering the workforce. Because education is time invariant, it drops
out during estimation leaving the returns to education unidentified. However, by interact-
ing a dummy for self-employment with education, a fixed effects model is able to measure
the premium (or penalty) on the returns to education for entrepreneurs. This premium (or
penalty) is identified in the model by individuals who move from self-employment to regular
employment and vice versa. The model is as follows:
yit = β0 + (Edui ∗ Selfit)′β1 + β2Selfit +X ′itβ3 + Zi + µi + vit (1.4)
where yit, (Edui ∗ Selfit) and Selfit are as identified in the ordinary least squares re-
gression. Vector X captures time variant variables like age and marital status. Vector Z
captures time invariant variables like race, gender and education that drop out during the
within transformation.17 µi captures the individual effect and vit is the residual.
All time invariant variables including education drop out in the fixed effects model. But,
I can identify β1 which captures the premium (or penalty) the self-employed receive on the
returns to their education. If the signaling model is correct, β1 < 0 and education is less
valuable for entrepreneurs. This coefficient is only identified through individuals who move
into or out of self-employment in the sample.
In summary, the OLS model is used as a baseline. The Heckman model corrects for
selection into entrepreneurship, but not for the endogeneity of education. It provides insights
into the effects of selection on the returns to education as well as makes it possible to compare
this paper with other papers that have employed the Heckman technique. Finally, the fixed
effects model controls for all types of unobservable heterogeneity by holding individual
characteristics constant and measuring the value of education as workers transition in and
out of self-employment.
17Education is typically predetermined prior to entry into the labor market. To avoid measurement error
issues, I replace every value of education for an individual with the highest level they ever report.
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1.4 Data
This paper uses data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 (SIPP96).
This dataset captures the movement of workers in and out of self-employment and has been
used previously in the entrepreneurship literature. It contains a number of unique features
that make it ideal to explore the question of interest.
The Survey of Income and Program Participation was created in the 1970’s to supplement
the CPS by providing a more accurate measure of income, employment, assets, health
insurance and participation in government programs. While the CPS required respondents
to report income on an annual basis, the SIPP surveyed households every 4 months. In 1996,
the SIPP was redesigned to cover 40,000 households interviewed over the course of 4 years.
This resulted in a sample of over 3 million monthly observations of working-age individuals.
The self-employed are only a small subset of the workforce and only a fraction of them move
into or out of self-employment in a given time frame. Therefore, a large dataset like the
SIPP is required to generate sufficient variation to study the movement of workers into and
out of self-employment.
Another benefit of the SIPP is that it contains very detailed information about the
self-employed. Unlike other surveys, the SIPP asks the self-employed a number of specific
questions about their business or businesses. Entrepreneurs are asked about the income
they draw from up to two distinct business. Data are collected on the incorporation sta-
tus of the business, the presence of a partner, historical earnings, expected earnings, the
industry of the business, and the age of the business. If the worker leaves self-employment,
the survey inquires as to the reasons for his/her departure. Every year, a topical survey
records the equity an individual holds in his/her business. This is important since a large
component of compensation for the self-employed is through the increased value of their
business. Moreover, entrepreneurs may limit the salary they draw to grow their business or
to avoid certain taxes.
While SIPP interviews are conducted three times a year, respondents are asked to recall
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information for each of the last 4 months. This format minimizes measurement error while
providing a detailed employment history. Monthly data is useful to pinpoint exactly when
someone moves into employment. It also makes it possible to determine whether some-
one moved directly from a job to self-employment (or vice versa) or whether a period of
unemployment occurred between the switch. This is useful to control for selection issues.
Although the SIPP is ideal in many respects, it does have some limitations. For ex-
ample, the SIPP contains monthly data but it only lasts for a period of 4 years. In such
a short period of time only a small number of workers switch between regular jobs and
self-employment. Moreover, the variation in any single worker’s wage will undoubtedly be
relatively small over the course of 4 years. The SIPP also provides little background infor-
mation about respondents. It does not include a measure of ability or any information on
family background. This makes pooled regressions of SIPP data subject to omitted vari-
able bias. Finally, the SIPP contains categorical variables for degree completed instead of a
continuous measure of education. This is the result of a decision in the 1980’s by the U.S.
Census Bureau to use degree-completed to measure post secondary education levels. Given
the aims of this paper, using degree categories rather than years of education is preferred
as degrees are more likely to act as a signal. Nonetheless, information on years of education
would be desirable to run robustness checks.
1.5 Summary Statistics
Prior to comparing the returns to education between entrepreneurs and employees it is
instructive to examine the differences between the two groups. Summary statistics for
the self-employed and private paid workers can be found in Table 1.1. The unemployed,
government workers, and non-profit workers are excluded from the sample. Similarly, part-
time workers are dropped from the sample. These adjustments are made in an effort to
compare two groups of full time workers who differ only in that some work for themselves
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and others work for a private employer.18
Table 1.1 shows that the self-employed are older, slightly better educated, more likely
to be male, less likely to be a minority and more likely to be married. The self-employed
work about 5.7 more hours per week on average. For their work, they earn $20.66 per
hour compared to the $15.08 per hour earned by private employees. This gap widens con-
siderably if the self-employed are credited with the increase in their business’ equity over
the month. While the self-employed earn more than their employee counterparts, these
summary statistics alone cannot predict whether their premium in pay will remain after
controlling for education and demographic differences between the two groups. Interest-
ingly, the self-employed do not appear to be under-investing in education as Wolpin (1977)
suggested they might if the returns to education are lower for the self-employed. Moreover,
this is not consistent with the theoretical possibility of high ability individuals who are
unable to acquire education flocking to self-employment.
Out of the workforce, 63.96 percent classify themselves as working for private employers
and 13.56 percent classify themselves as self-employed.20 This is a slightly higher frequency
of self-employed workers than what others studies have found, but it is not unreasonably
high. In a fixed effects model, the returns to education for entrepreneurs are identified
only by those people who move into or out of self-employment (henceforth called switch-
ers). Individuals who switch between the two categories at least once in the panel make
up 15.0 percent of the workforce. It is natural to ask whether people who switch between
self-employment and paid employment are systematically different from people who do not
switch jobs. If there are serious differences between the two groups, selection may bias
the results of a fixed effects estimation. Table 1.2 provides statistics on the differences be-
18Interestingly, the pay gap widens considerably when including part time workers. This may be because
part time entrepreneurs choose only the most lucrative projects. Or, they may consider their work to be a
side job and neglect to properly account for expenses. Regardless, for the purposes of this paper it makes
sense to ignore this atypical group.
20Government and not-for-profit employees are excluded from analysis.
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Table 1.1: Self-employed vs. Employees
Self-employed Employee Difference T-Statistic
Age (years) 45.39 41.28 4.11 109.60
Education (years) 13.67 13.46 0.21 20.20
High School (%) 0.30 0.31 -0.01 -4.25
Some College (%) 0.27 0.31 -0.04 -22.93
College Degree (%) 0.19 0.18 0.01 6.11
Graduate Degree (%) 0.13 0.10 0.03 27.93
Weekly Hours (%) 51.86 46.11 5.75 118.00
Male (%) 0.74 0.53 0.21 132.30
Black (%) 0.05 0.11 -0.06 -79.45
Hispanic (%) 0.07 0.10 -0.02 -26.18
Other (%) 0.05 0.04 0.00 6.07
Married (%) 0.75 0.64 0.11 72.78
Tenure (years) 10.47 7.39 3.07 91.06
Hourly Wage ($) 20.66 15.08 5.59 54.51
Hourly Wage with Equity ($) 42.27 15.08 27.19 76.82
Restricted to individuals over the age of 24 who are not in school or working part time.
Table 1.2: Self-employed: Switchers vs. Non-switchers
Switchers Non-Switchers Difference T-Statistic
Age 41.82 47.73 -5.91 -79.63
Education (years) 13.41 13.61 -0.20 -9.94
High School (%) 0.29 0.30 -0.02 -5.35
Some College (%) 0.31 0.27 0.04 13.63
College Degree (%) 0.18 0.19 -0.01 -4.32
Graduate (%) 0.10 0.13 -0.02 -11.03
Weekly Hours (%) 42.10 44.14 -2.04 -15.48
Male (%) 0.64 0.68 -0.03 -9.63
Black (%) 0.06 0.05 0.01 6.82
Hispanic (%) 0.10 0.06 0.04 20.04
Other (%) 0.04 0.04 0.00 -3.53
Married (%) 0.70 0.75 -0.06 -18.01
Hourly Wage ($) 22.21 24.98 -2.77 -4.27
Hourly Wage with Equity ($) 48.43 61.94 -13.51 -6.99
Tenure (years) 5.89 11.81 -5.92 -101.47
Incorporated Business (%) 0.22 0.27 -0.05 -17.37
These are self-employed individuals who at some time during the panel move from self-employment to
regular employment or vice versa.
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Table 1.3: Employees: Switchers vs. Non-switchers
Switchers Non-Switchers Difference T-Statistic
Age 41.09 41.00 0.09 1.30
Education (years) 13.36 13.05 0.31 16.58
High School (%) 0.28 0.34 -0.06 -20.90
Some College (%) 0.30 0.32 -0.01 -4.32
College Degree (%) 0.19 0.16 0.03 10.55
Graduate (%) 0.10 0.06 0.04 20.75
Weekly Hours (%) 41.50 42.32 -0.82 -8.10
Male (%) 0.63 0.53 0.09 29.22
Black (%) 0.07 0.10 -0.03 -18.36
Hispanic (%) 0.11 0.10 0.00 2.03
Other (%) 0.04 0.04 0.00 -1.81
Married (%) 0.66 0.63 0.02 8.07
Hourly Wage ($) 16.41 14.87 1.54 6.60
Tenure (years) 3.85 6.56 -2.71 -61.97
These are current employees who at some time during the panel move from self-employment
to regular employment or vice versa.
tween self-employed switchers and self-employed non-switchers. On average, self-employed
switchers are 5.9 years younger than and earn slightly less than those who are self-employed
throughout the sample. Educational attainment is slightly lower for switchers but the differ-
ences are small. Table 1.3 shows the differences between employee switchers and employee
non-switchers. For employees, the impact of switching is reversed. Switchers are about the
same age as non-switchers, but they earn 1.54 dollars more per hour and have slightly higher
levels of educational attainment. Switching during the panel is correlated with higher wages
for employees and lower wages for the self-employed.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Ordinary Least Squares
The results from the ordinary least square regression are available in Table 1.4. The results
are best summarized by breaking the variables into categories.
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Table 1.4: Ordinary Least Squares
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Log hourly wage Base Equity No Prof. No Prof. + Equity
High School 0.178*** 0.176*** 0.179*** 0.176***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Some College 0.323*** 0.321*** 0.313*** 0.312***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
College Degree 0.618*** 0.618*** 0.607*** 0.605***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Graduate Degree 0.843*** 0.840*** 0.798*** 0.795***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
High School x Self −0.048*** 0.083*** −0.049*** 0.082***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Some College x Self −0.036*** 0.094*** −0.030*** 0.099***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
College x Self −0.102*** 0.014 −0.108*** 0.009
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Graduate x Self 0.071*** 0.186*** −0.179*** −0.052***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Self-Employed −0.233*** −0.016 −0.227*** −0.01
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Incorporated 0.246*** 0.309*** 0.248*** 0.314***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Job Tenure 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Business Tenure 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Left Bus. Voluntarily 0.032*** 0.079*** 0.030*** 0.081***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Left Bus. Involuntarily −0.101*** −0.102*** −0.094*** −0.099***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Left Job Voluntarily −0.040*** −0.016*** −0.036*** −0.012**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Left Job. Involuntarily −0.130*** −0.119*** −0.128*** −0.119***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Switcher: Self to Emp. −0.023* −0.120*** −0.028** −0.121***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Switcher: Emp. to Self 0.079*** 0.149*** 0.079*** 0.151***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Total Switches −0.098*** −0.098*** −0.101*** −0.110***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
(%) Unemployed −0.068*** 0.009 −0.054*** 0.019**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
N. of Observations 520,626 506,598 502,262 489,210
R2 0.207 0.201 0.2 0.188
Age, race, gender, and region variables omitted for space.
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Demographics Age, male, white, and marriage are correlated with higher earnings. Peo-
ple who live in urban areas or in the Northeast or Western regions of the United States
also receive a wage premium. These variables are omitted from the table due to space
constraints.
Self-employment Penalty Consistent with the literature, being self-employed is accom-
panied with a 23.3 percent wage penalty.
Education High school graduates earn 17.8 percent more than dropouts. A college degree
raises that premium to 61.8 percent. Those who receive graduate degrees earn 84.3 percent
more than high school dropouts. However, the self-employed earn lower returns on their
education. A high school diploma is worth an estimated 4.8 percent less to someone who is
self-employed. Entrepreneurs who attend college find that their degree is worth 10.2 percent
less than their employee counterparts. Interestingly, the relationship is reversed for the most
highly educated individuals. A graduate degree is worth 7.1 percent more to an entrepreneur
than to a paid worker. These results are curious since the theoretical model predicts that
the correlation between education and income should only be lower for entrepreneurs after
controlling for the endogeneity of education. Therefore, these results may be driven by
selection into entrepreneurship as opposed to signaling.
Business Variables One of the advantages of the SIPP is that it contains data on a
person’s tenure at a job or with their business. Each year someone stays at a job increases
his/her wage by 1.6 percent. This is consistent with the theory of firm-specific human
capital. Similarly, self-employed wages increase by .56 percent for every year they stay
with the business. Individuals that own an incorporated business enjoy a 24.6 percent wage
premium over non-incorporated entrepreneurs. This is likely due to selection effects. More
successful businesses are more likely to go through the hassle of becoming incorporated.
However, incorporated entrepreneurs are able to reduce their immediate tax burden by only
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drawing a portion of their earnings as a salary and avoiding paying payroll taxes on earnings
retained by the company. Therefore, it appears that the selection effects of incorporation
dominate the tax incentive effects.
Panel Variables The regression also includes variables on why an individual left his/her
last job or business. Leaving a business voluntarily is correlated with a 3.2 percent increase
in wages while leaving a business involuntarily is correlated with a 10.1 percent decline in
wages. Leaving a previous job is always associated with a wage penalty, but the penalty is
substantially more severe if the job loss was involuntary.
Similarly, the regression controls for whether someone switched between self and paid
employment during the panel and the direction of the switch. Consistent with the sum-
mary statistics, being a switcher is correlated with nearly a 10 percent decline in wages.
This penalty largely disappears for people who are moving from employment into self-
employment but is slightly exacerbated by individuals moving out of self-employment. This
is consistent with individuals who fail at entrepreneurship being penalized when they return
to the traditional labor force. Or, alternatively, it suggests that poor labor market prospects
drive low ability workers into self-employment.
Alternative Specification: Added Equity
As discussed earlier, an entrepreneur’s salary underestimates the marginal product of his
labor if his productivity increases the value of the business. Therefore, even measures of
profits will underestimate the value created by an entrepreneur if his firm is growing. The
SIPP contains data on business equity yearly. I use linear imputation to create an estimate
of the equity added each month. This is added to an entrepreneur’s salary draw and divided
by hours to determine hourly wage. This is, unfortunately, an imperfect solution. The value
of a private business is based on the subjective opinion of the entrepreneur introducing the
potential for substantial measurement error. Also, changes in business equity capture both
the returns to an owner’s labor and capital invested in the business. Finally, business equity
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is a household variable which may be double counted if two spouses own a business jointly.
For these reasons, it is more appropriate to consider the hourly wage including added equity
as the upper bound on the true wage a self-employed person is earning.
Given the above qualifications, incorporating added equity into log hourly wage has some
significant consequences. It reduces the penalty on self-employment to less than 2 percent.
It doubles the returns to business tenure and increases the coefficient on incorporation
from 24.6 to 30.9 percent. Finally, it makes the interaction between self-employment and
education positive for all degree categories (although college is not statistically significant).
Alternative Specification: Excluding Professionals
Part of the motivation for comparing the returns to education of entrepreneurs and the
self-employed is that they represent screened and unscreened groups. Employers screen
employees on the basis of education. The self-employed do not face such screening. However,
as Wolpin (1977) and others in the literature have noted, some entrepreneurs may use
education to signal to their customers. For example, professionals like doctors and lawyers
often own their own practices and are thus self-employed. However, they are not able to
legally practice unless they have attained a certain level of education. Consequently, their
customers may very well base their choice of a doctor or lawyer on his or her educational
credentials. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to consider self-employed doctors and
lawyers to be an unscreened group.
Another problem with such professionals is that they often begin their careers working
as an employee in a practice. Later, only after gaining experience and building a reputation,
they take over the practice of a retiring practitioner or establish their own practice.21 For this
group, selection into self-employment is a proxy for career advancement and the interaction
of self-employment and education is biased upward.
To avoid these issues I run a regression specification that excludes professionals in the
fields of law and medicine. The results can be seen in Table 1.4. In the original regression,
21For example, when lawyers make partner in the firm they become self-employed and their salary jumps.
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self-employed individuals with an advanced degree receive a 7.1 percent premium on their
education. Excluding professionals turns that into a 17.9 percent penalty. It is problematic
to subjectively pick and choose occupations where educational signaling may be important
for the self-employed. Given that this issue will predominately affect workers with advanced
degrees, the returns to education for this group should be interpreted with caution.
1.6.2 Heckman Selection Model
The first stage probit results can be seen in Table 1.5. Education and male are strongly
correlated with selection into self-employment. Minorities are significantly less likely to
become self-employed. Older workers are more likely to enter the workforce in general.
Living in an urban area is correlated with an increased probability of being a paid employee.
λ is statistically significant at the 95 percent level indicating that selection is indeed a
problem. The first selection instrument, spousal insurance, is strongly positive for the self-
employed and strongly negative for employees. The second instrument, log of housing equity,
is also positive for the self-employed and negative for employees. A doubling of home equity
makes a person about 1 percent more likely to be self-employed and 1 percent less likely
to be an employee. This is consistent with my predictions about the relationship between
health insurance, housing equity and employment choices.
The results from these second stage regressions can be seen in Table 1.6. Controlling for
selection and running the regressions separately indicate that the returns to education are
as high, if not a little higher, for entrepreneurs. This contradicts the earlier pooled OLS
findings. A high school degree increases wages by 19.2 percent for the self-employed, but only
11 percent for a paid employee. A college degree is worth roughly the same to both groups.
These findings suggest that unobservable differences between the self-employed are driving
the low returns to education seen by entrepreneurs under OLS. One plausible explanation,
where high ability individuals unable to signal select into self-employment, was described in
Section 1.1. However, it is also possible that the returns to education are simply inversely
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Table 1.5: Heckman First Stage: Marginal Effects
Self-employed Employee
Age 0.0121 0.0283
(0.0002) (0.0003)
Age2 -0.0001 -0.0004
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Male 0.0803 0.0589
(0.0005) (0.0010)
Black -0.0250 -0.0078
(0.0007) (0.0019)
Hispanic -0.0146 -0.0080
(0.0009) (0.0021)
Other Race 0.0103 0.0118
(0.0013) (0.0027)
High School 0.0235 -0.0025
(0.0011) (0.0019)
Some College 0.0282 -0.0126
(0.0012) (0.0019)
College Degree 0.0411 -0.0455
(0.0015) (0.0019)
Graduate Degree 0.0720 -0.1022
(0.0020) (0.0019)
Married -0.0063 -0.0153
(0.0007) (0.0012)
Disabled -0.0308 -0.1437
(0.0006) (0.0015)
Metropolitan Resident -0.0084 0.0242
(0.0006) (0.0012)
Northeast -0.0063 0.0062
(0.0006) (0.0014)
North Central -0.0049 0.0135
(0.0005) (0.0012)
West -0.0052 0.0058
(0.0006) (0.0014)
Spousal Insurance 0.0664 -0.1371
(0.0007) (0.0010)
Log Housing Equity 0.0098 -0.0106
(0.0002) (0.0004)
N. of Observations 897,677 897,677
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Table 1.6: Heckman Model: Second Stage
Log hourly wage Self-employed Employee Difference
Age 0.083*** 0.016*** 0.067
(0.005) (0.001)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001
0.000 0.000
Male 0.523*** 0.166*** 0.357
(0.015) (0.004)
Black -0.313*** -0.115*** -0.198
(0.027) (0.006)
Hispanic -0.162*** -0.142*** -0.02
(0.026) (0.007)
Other Race -0.064** -0.128*** 0.064
(0.023) (0.009)
High School 0.192*** 0.110*** 0.082***
(0.023) (0.006) (0.022)
Some College 0.355*** 0.259*** 0.096***
(0.023) (0.006) (0.022)
College Degree 0.556*** 0.576*** -0.02
(0.024) (0.007) (0.024)
Graduate 0.992*** 0.848*** 0.144***
(0.026) (0.009) (0.026)
Married 0.007 0.094*** -0.087
(0.014) (0.004)
Incorporated 0.380*** 0.38
(0.010)
Business Tenure 0.020*** 0.02
(0.001)
Job Tenure 0.022*** -0.004
(0.000)
Disabled -0.191*** -0.017 -0.022
(0.026) (0.010)
Metropolitan Area 0.124*** 0.161*** -0.174
(0.011) (0.004)
Northeast -0.037** 0.078*** -0.037
(0.013) (0.004)
North Central -0.044*** -0.004 -0.115
(0.012) (0.004)
West 0.145*** 0.149*** -0.04
(0.014) (0.005)
Inverse Mills 0.277*** -0.351*** 0.628
(0.022) (0.011)
Standard errors on difference calculated through bootstrapping.
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correlated to traits common among entrepreneurs. Interestingly, self-employed men earn
52.3 percent more than self-employed women. The gender pay differential in the paid sector
is only 16.6 percent. This may be capturing educated woman who are staying home with
their children and working at home due to situation rather than choice. These women
would likely earn lower returns on their education and may be driving the entrepreneurial
education penalty that appeared in the OLS results.
1.6.3 Fixed Effects Model
The results from the fixed effects model can be seen in Table 1.7. High school graduates who
are self-employed receive a small premium on their degree, but it is statistically insignificant.
However, self-employed individuals with some college, a bachelors degree, or a graduate
degree see statistically significant higher returns to their education. The premium for a
4-year college degree is 12.1 percent. This is inconsistent with the signaling explanation of
education. To test the robustness of these findings, I run a specification of the model that
controls for changes in an entrepreneur’s business equity. Combining changes in business
equity with income to calculate the hourly wage only strengthens the findings of the baseline
model. The returns to education become higher for the self-employed across all degree
categories. A college degree is worth 20.3 percent more to entrepreneurs than to paid
employees. Also, the wage penalty for self-employment diminishes but does not disappear.
It falls to only 11.8 percent after controlling for business equity. This indicates that the
self-employment wage penalty prevalent in the literature cannot be explained by inaccurate
measures of entrepreneurial income.
In the final specification, medical and legal professionals are dropped from the sample.
This adjustment reverses the sign on the returns to education for the self-employed with the
highest level of education. Those with graduate degrees go from receiving a 10.5 percent
premium return on education when they are self-employed to receiving a 16.7 percent penalty
on education. It is possible that graduate degrees convey a valuable signal to employees,
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but not entrepreneurs. But, it is imprudent to make such inferences with any certainty
since the occupation restrictions are rather arbitrary and the number of individuals with
advanced degrees is relatively small.22 Other studies that treat education as a continuous
variable may be biased by the inclusion of workers with graduate degrees.
Time Variant Selection
The fixed effects model controls for unobserved individual characteristics that are time
invariant. However, it cannot control for selection into or out of self-employment that de-
pends on time variant variables. And, the factors that motivate people to enter or leave
self-employment are not random. For example, individuals who are laid off may resort
to self-employment as an alternative to unemployment. Similarly, leaving a good job vol-
untarily, is suggestive of an attractive and well-thought-out self-employment opportunity.
Movements out of self-employment are also subject to selection problems. Entrepreneurs
whose businesses are unsuccessful will exit self-employment and their movement is an in-
dication of failure. However, an exit from self-employment may also indicate the sale of
a successful business or the retirement of a business owner. These selection issues can be
classified by the direction of the move (into or out of self-employment) and the nature of
the move (voluntary or involuntary).
Unfortunately, as these variables tend to vary across individuals but not within indi-
viduals, they cannot be estimated within a fixed effects model. Therefore, to test for the
presence of time invariant selection issues I run four separate fixed effects regression by type
of movement. Individuals who move from self-employment to employment are in one group
and are contrasted with those who move the opposite direction. Similarly, individuals who
leave their job or business voluntarily are contrasted with those who leave involuntarily.
The results can be seen in Table A.1.
First, I examine the differences between voluntary and involuntary movements. The
22In an attempt to be less arbitrary, I ran an alternative model excluding all individuals in occupations
that are subject to occupational licensing restrictions in all 50 states. The results were very similar to when
only doctors and lawyers were excluded.
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Table 1.7: Fixed Effects Models
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Log hourly wage Base Equity No Prof. No Prof. + Equity
Age 0.105*** 0.073*** 0.106*** 0.077***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age2 −0.001*** 0.000 −0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High School x Self 0.058 0.114** 0.058 0.116***
(0.031) (0.035) (0.030) (0.034)
Some College x Self 0.078* 0.136*** 0.080** 0.137***
(0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.035)
College x Self 0.121*** 0.203*** 0.111*** 0.209***
(0.034) (0.038) (0.034) (0.038)
Graduate x Self 0.105** 0.200*** −0.167*** 0.025
(0.038) (0.043) (0.042) (0.048)
Self-Employed −0.303*** −0.118*** −0.308*** −0.118***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029)
Married −0.003 0.007 −0.006 0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Incorporated 0.017* 0.015 0.005 0.004
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Job Tenure 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Business Tenure 0.003*** 0.029*** 0.005*** 0.029***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Disabled −0.042*** −0.062*** −0.044*** −0.069***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Metropolitan Area 0.025** 0.009 0.024** 0.012
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Northeast 0.04 0.066* 0.032 0.056
(0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029)
North Central 0.043 0.075** 0.049* 0.082**
(0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026)
West 0.057* 0.072** 0.069** 0.084**
(0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026)
(%) Unemployed −0.044*** −0.104*** −0.046*** −0.104***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant −0.240** −0.565*** −0.308*** −0.678***
(0.077) (0.087) (0.078) (0.087)
N. of Observations 414,114 402,759 400,318 389,749
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self-employment wage penalty is 16.4 percent larger for individuals who leave their job or
business involuntarily compared to those who leave voluntarily.23 This may be capturing
individuals who are laid off from their job or those who reenter the work force after failing
at running a small business. However, there is no clear pattern in the returns to education
for the self-employed. Many of the coefficients are insignificant. There simply may not be
enough underlying variation to identify differences at this level of inquiry.
Next, I examine the impact of the direction of the move. The self-employment wage
penalty is 14.2 percent larger for people who move from a job to self-employment relative to
those who move in the opposite direction. The interaction of education and self-employment
is positive for those who move into self-employment and negative for those who move out of
self-employment. This may be capturing that education is less important after a period of
job market experience. Again, these signs are largely insignificant, especially for movements
out of self-employment.
1.7 Conclusion
Measuring the value of education to entrepreneurs is very valuable. It can help policymakers
promote entrepreneurship and it promises to shed light on whether education is valuable
because it increases human capital or acts as a signal. However, it is quite difficult to ac-
curately compare the returns to education between entrepreneurs and employees. People
not only self-select into self-employment, but education is correlated with innate ability.
Most of the literature making inferences about signaling from the returns to education has
not addressed these issues sufficiently. I use a stylized model to show how inferences about
signaling will only be accurate after controlling for the endogeneity of education and selec-
tion into self-employment. To identify the impact of selection on the returns to education
I compare a Heckman model to an ordinary least squares regression. This indicates that
selection into entrepreneurship biases the returns to education for entrepreneurs downward.
23Comparing the coefficient on Self − employed in column (a) to column (b).
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To control for all time invariant individual heterogeneity (which deals with the endogenous
nature of education) I utilize a fixed effects model. The fixed effects model indicates that a
college degree is worth about 12 percent more to the self-employed. Adjusting the earnings
of entrepreneurs to compensate for the increasing value of their businesses only increases the
education wage premium enjoyed by entrepreneurs. This contradicts the signaling model
and goes beyond the human capital model’s prediction of equal returns. It appears that
education has a greater impact on the productivity of entrepreneurs than employees. This
findings should be taken with caution given the methodological difficulties of comparing
returns across the two groups. While the fixed effects model solves for time invariant in-
dividual heterogeneity, it is possible that time variant selection is influencing the findings.
Nevertheless, given that this paper’s results are consistent with the other panel study of this
issue (Van der Sluis, Van Praag and Vijverberg, 2009) it is worth considering what might
be able to explain a premium return on education for entrepreneurs. It seems unlikely that
the effect of education on entrepreneurial networks could generate the premium seen in the
data. Van der Sluis, Van Praag and Vijverberg (2009) suggest that the self-employed are
able to choose work that complements their human capital. But, I find this theory prob-
lematic. Employees are also able to pick careers where their human capital is most highly
valued. Moreover, high school and college degrees rarely convey specific job skills. Rather,
they provide strong foundations in math, English, science and exercise students’ broad an-
alytical and communication skills. It may be that being well rounded in these areas is more
beneficial to an entrepreneur who must do many different tasks than to an employee who is
more likely to specialize on a single task. This would be consistent with the jack-of-all-trades
model of entrepreneurship proposed by Lazear (2004). There is ample need for research to
confirm and explain the entrepreneurship education premium.
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Chapter 2
Do the Unemployed Make Good
Entrepreneurs? A Model and
Evidence
2.1 Introduction
Policymakers have a longstanding interest in self-employment as an antidote to unemploy-
ment. Entrepreneurs1 create their own jobs and, with any success, create jobs for their
employees. For these reasons, many developed countries encourage the unemployed to start
their own businesses. For example, Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden and Ger-
many all provide financial incentives for the unemployed to start small businesses. Some of
these programs are quite large. For example, Germany spent the equivalent of 680 million
USD on its program in 1998 (Reize, 2000). The United States’ relatively small program is
known as the Self-Employment Assistance Program. Changes to the law in 2012 expanded
the scope of this program and relaxed the requirement that participants continue to search
for full-time work to remain eligible.2 Given the policy implications, the relationship between
unemployment and self-employment has received considerable attention by economists.
Much of the literature focuses on the macro-level relationship between rates of unem-
ployment and entry into self-employment. In theory, recessions affect participation in en-
1Consistent with other work, I will use the terms self-employment and entrepreneurship interchangeably
even though many individuals who are self-employed are not particularly innovative.
2See the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act.
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trepreneurship via two channels. According to the “recession-push” hypothesis pioneered
by Oxenfeldt (1943), individuals facing low job market prospects have a lower opportunity
cost of becoming self-employed and are more likely to enter self-employment. This indicates
a positive relationship between unemployment and self-employment rates. In contrast, the
“prosperity-pull” hypothesis argues that high rates of unemployment are indicative of re-
cessions. During economic downturns the cost of used capital is higher and the demand for
entrepreneurs’ products is lower. This makes self-employment less desirable and implies a
negative relationship between self-employment and unemployment. Empirical studies con-
flate these two effects. Parker (2004) provides a comprehensive review of the literature.
He finds that most cross-sectional studies report a negative relationship between the local
unemployment rate and the probability that an individual is self-employed. In contrast,
most time-series studies show a positive relationship between local unemployment rates and
entrepreneurship entry. Efforts to reconcile these findings have been of limited success.
While the effect of local unemployment rates on local self-employment rates is unclear,
there is strong consensus that unemployed individuals themselves are more likely to en-
ter self-employment.3 Evans and Jovanovic (1989) find that between 1968 and 1986 un-
employed individuals were almost twice as likely to enter self-employment as employees
were. Von Greiff (2009) finds that displaced workers are almost twice as likely to enter
self-employment in the year after displacement. Similarly, unemployment has been linked
to entry into self-employment in other developed countries such as Spain, Canada and the
United Kingdom (Carrasco, 1999, Kuhn and Schuetze, 2001, Meager, 1992).
This evidence has raised the concern that individuals who are “pushed” into self-employment
may be of lower quality than typical entrepreneurs. It is likely that the unemployed as a
group have lower cognitive ability. Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006) find that cognitive
skills affect employment outcomes and Heineck (2011), using German data, finds the unem-
3For an unemployed individual the “recession-push” effect dominates the “prosperity-pull” effect. But,
the unemployed are only a subset of the labor force. Since the “prosperity-pull” affects all the labor force,
it is quite possible for the self-employment rates in the general population to fall as the unemployment rate
rises.
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ployed to have somewhat lower cognitive skills. At the very least, the unemployed tend to
be less valuable as workers than typical employees. Therefore, Evans and Jovanovic (1989)
label these workers as “misfits.” They find that, in addition to the unemployed, individu-
als receiving relatively low wages and who have changed jobs frequently are most likely to
enter entrepreneurship. Von Greiff (2009) argues that during times of high unemployment
“misfits” characterized by low-income potential and low levels of wealth dominate entry
into self-employment. In contrast, cross-sectional studies indicate that the self-employed
typically have higher levels of education and assets (Hamilton, 2000). Moreover, evidence
suggests that successful entrepreneurs are well-rounded “jack-of-all trades” (Lazear, 2004).
There is concern that public policies that encourage the unemployed to transition into
self-employment may be setting up such workers for failure. But, the relevant question is
not whether formerly unemployed entrepreneurs are as successful as typical entrepreneurs.
Rather, the question of interest is whether displaced workers are better off seeking paid
employment or becoming self-employed. It is certainly plausible that “misfits” who may be
eccentric, risk-loving, or difficult to work with might have a comparative advantage working
for themselves. It would be ideal to compare the earnings of a displaced worker when he
becomes self-employed to the earnings he would have received if he had taken paid employ-
ment. Since this is impossible, I employ an alternative approach.
I utilize a simple model to characterize the duration of self-employment spells. I show
that in equilibrium, survival rates should be unrelated to an entrant’s innate ability. While
low ability workers will earn less as entrepreneurs, they will also earn less in paid employ-
ment. Therefore, the probability an individual will survive in self-employment depends on
how his earnings compare to his expectations. However, a growing number of studies using
international data find that unemployed individuals who transition into self-employment do
not survive as long as former employees. Taylor (1999), using British data, finds that each
previous month of unemployment reduces the probability of survival by 1.2 percent. Ander-
sson and Wadensj (2007), employing a probit model, find that formerly unemployed Swedes
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are 11-18 percent more likely to exit self-employment. Using Spanish data, Carrasco (1999)
finds that unemployment increases the hazard rate in the first few quarters by between two
and three fold. For simplicity, I will refer to this negative relationship between former un-
employment and self-employment survival as the duration puzzle. To my knowledge, there
have been no U.S. studies on the duration puzzle.
To explain the duration puzzle, I suggest that unemployed individuals overestimate their
entrepreneurial potential at entry. I put forth this hypothesis on the basis of evidence from
behavioral economics and the psychology literature.
A consistent finding in behavioral economics is that individuals frequently overestimate
their abilities. One popular example is that 93 percent of American drivers consider them-
selves to be more skillful than a median driver (Svenson, 1981). Another study finds that
MBA students systematically overestimate the number of job offers they will receive (Hoch,
1985). Similarly, economists find that the levels of trading volume in financial markets far
exceed what a model based on rational investment would predict. Barber and Odean (2001)
provide evidence that investor overconfidence is responsible. The pattern that emerges over a
number of studies is that overconfidence is greatest for tasks that are difficult, unpredictable,
and lacking in meaningful feedback (Barber and Odean, 2001). These traits characterize
the decision an individual faces when evaluating whether to enter self-employment. The
market is often unfamiliar and the variation in possible outcomes is high. Therefore, it is
not surprising that empirical work finds entrepreneurs overconfident in their abilities. In a
study of 2,994 recent entrants to self-employment, 81 percent perceived their odds of suc-
cess to be better than 70 percent (Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg, 1988). An outstanding 33
percent felt that their success was guaranteed. Of particular interest, individuals with poor
backgrounds (low amounts of education and experience etc.) were just as optimistic about
their chances of success.
To my knowledge, no study has tested whether overconfidence is related to an individ-
ual’s work status prior to entry. However, there are compelling reasons to suspect that
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unemployed workers transitioning into self-employment might be especially prone to over-
confidence. As noted earlier, unemployed workers as a group have below average ability.
Recent developments in the psychology literature find that low ability individuals are par-
ticularly prone to overconfidence. As explained in the first of many articles on the subject
by Kruger and Dunning (1989) (pg. 1121):
“In essence, we argue that the skills that engender competence in a particular
domain are often the very same skills necessary to evaluate competence in that
domain–one’s own or anyone else’s. Because of this, incompetent individuals
lack what cognitive psychologists...term metacognition...the ability to know how
well one is performing, when one is likely to be accurate in judgment, and when
one is likely to be in error.”
Experimental tests by the authors in the fields of humor, grammar, and logic show that
participants in the bottom quartile grossly overestimate their performance while participants
in higher quartiles have much more accurate assessments of their performance. An informal
way of expressing this finding is that because low ability individuals “don’t know what they
don’t know,” they are overconfident.
Additionally, job displacement itself may contribute to overconfidence. Workers have
imperfect information about ability and therefore use wages to make inferences about their
true ability. However, wages are a function not only of ability but of firm rents and firm-
specific human capital. Bheim, Horvath andWinter-Ebmer (2010) find evidence that workers
overattribute high wages in the past to innate ability. Workers do not realistically account for
their firm-specific value when making inferences about their market value. As a result, they
find that workers displaced from companies paying wages with large firm-specific components
are unemployed longer than usual. The implication is that displaced workers imperfectly
interpret their past wages and therefore have an inflated view of their innate ability. This
may make available job offers seem unattractive relative to self-employment. The problem
is exacerbated by the tendency of layoffs to target workers with unjustifiably high wages.
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Also, the effects of job loss and/or job searching have unique psychological effects. The
unemployed face social stigma and financial strain. Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998)
find that the non-pecuniary costs of unemployment far exceed the monetary costs of forgone
wages. A meta-analysis of over 300 studies on the mental health effects of unemployment
finds that unemployment is linked to lower self-esteem and higher rates of depression (Paul
and Moser, 2009). These symptoms were particularly pronounced for extended periods
of unemployment. It is therefore likely that as the duration of unemployment prior to
entry into self-employment increases, an individual’s confidence at entry will decline. These
individuals, therefore, should be less likely to exit self-employment. This feature acts as
another testable implication of overconfidence.
It should be noted that the effect of unemployment on overconfidence will depend on
how a person became unemployed. Individuals who are laid-off will have a much different
psychological profile from those who take advantage of early retirement. Some unemployed
individuals may be taking a leisurely break from work while others will be struggling to make
ends meet. Unfortunately, data limitations make it difficult to know why an individual
is unemployed. It is possible to make generalization about the unemployed as a group.
However, any public policy efforts should acknowledge that there are substantial differences
between different types of unemployed people.
2.2 Theoretical Model
2.2.1 Background
An influential paper by Jovanovic (1982) models entrepreneurs as heterogeneous individ-
uals with imperfect information about their abilities. His model implies that transitions
into and out of self-employment are driven by changing beliefs about individuals’ innate en-
trepreneurial ability. This was a major deviation from previous models such as Lucas (1978)
who assumes that individuals know their own ability and Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) who
assume that entrepreneurship is driven by risk preferences. Jovanovic (1982) is now the stan-
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dard model in the literature as its predictions are consistent with a large body of empirical
evidence (Parker, 2004). My model is based on Frank (1988), an extension of Jovanovic
(1982).4 While Frank (1988) allows workers to learn about their ability more quickly by
working more, I require hours to be constant across all individuals. Unlike Frank (1988),
I solve the model numerically to generate a number of predictions about self-employment
duration. Later, I tweak the model to allow workers to overestimate their true ability.
2.2.2 Setup
A risk-neutral individual is considering self-employment. Upon entry, the firm will be a price
taker. Each period the entrepreneur will decide to keep operating (bt = 0) or exit (bt = 1).
If entrepreneurship is unsuccessful, the individual can return to the traditional labor market
and earn wage Ut (in terms of utility). The outside wage, Ut, does not change as long as
the worker is self-employed.5 In order to enter self-employment, the individual must incur
a sunk cost C. There are no costs to shut down. There are a finite number of periods
T . Individuals do not know their own entrepreneurial ability. However, the distribution of
entrepreneurial ability, α, is known to be normally distributed such that α ∼ N (m1, σ2α).
Earnings, Rt, are noisy signals of ability. It is known to individuals that the process which
generates Rt is:
Rt = α + t (2.1)
where t is known to be normally distributed such that t ∼ N (0, σ2 ). At entry, an en-
trepreneur’s best guess of his ability is the population average m1.
6 As the entrepreneur
remains in the market and observes Rt, he uses Bayes’ rule to update the estimated value of
α. The updated guess is denoted by mt+1. This estimate will also be normally distributed
4I base my model on Frank (1988) because it can be solved via backwards induction and is more concise
than Jovanovic (1982).
5In other words, job search and full-time entrepreneurship are mutually exclusive. Also, while Ut is
constant through time, the time subscript is included to make later comparisons with time variant variables
more clear.
6It is not necessary for all individuals in the economy to be identical. Therefore, m1 can be thought of
the population average conditional on observed characteristics such as age, education etc.
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with mean mt+1 and precision (inverse of variance) ht+1 as follows
7:
mt+1 =
htmt + hRt
ht + h
(2.2)
ht+1 = ht + h (2.3)
where h =
1
σ2
. As an entrepreneur remains in the market, precision increases and the
estimate of ability becomes more accurate. To illustrate this process, consider a new self-
employed person with innate entrepreneurial ability of 60. In period 1, the individual’s best
guess of his ability is 50, the population average. Through time the individual’s earnings
will allow him to make a more informed estimate of ability using Equation 2.2. This process
is illustrated in Figure 2.1.8
Figure 2.1: Updating Estimates of Entrepreneurial Ability
Let Πt be the present discounted value of an individual’s expected utility at time t if he
acts optimally henceforth. Et is the expectation operator based on the information at time
7This is proven in DeGroot (2005). I am also able to confirm the predictions of the formula using
Bayesian inference.
8The individual knows the distribution of α and . In this example, σ = 10 and σα = 10.
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t. Each period, the entrepreneur observes earnings Rt which are discounted by β where
(0 < β ≤ 1). The individual faces the following maximization problem:
Π1 = max
b1
{b1U1 + (1− b1) [E1R1 − C] + βE1Π2}
t = 1
(2.4)
Πt = max
bt
{btUt + (1− bt)EtRt + βEtΠt+1}
t = 2, 3...T
(2.5)
Each period, the entrepreneur chooses to exit (bt = 1) if the outside wage is greater than
the expected earnings today plus the net present value of having the option of entrepreneur-
ship tomorrow. Part of the incentive to remain self-employed is that entrepreneurial ability
may turn out to be higher than currently thought (the individual having been just unlucky
so far). It is worthwhile to learn more about one’s entrepreneurial ability because if one is
indeed talented at entrepreneurship the payoff can be quite high. Once an individual exits
self-employment, re-entry will not occur, asmt will remain constant and Ut is time invariant.
2.2.3 Solution
The model captured by Equations 2.1-2.5 can be solved via backwards induction. In the
final period, there is no future so there is no value in remaining self-employed to learn about
unknown entrepreneurial ability. Therefore, the maximization problem in the final period
reduces to:
ΠT = max
bT
{bTUT + (1− bT )mT} (2.6)
The individual will remain self-employed (bT = 0) if his estimated entrepreneurial ability
exceeds the outside wage (mT > UT ). Otherwise, the entrepreneur will exit (bT = 1). In
the second to last period, the entrepreneur faces the following maximization problem:
ΠT−1 = max
bT−1
{bT−1UT−1 + (1− bT−1)mT−1 + βET−1ΠT} (2.7)
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where:
ET−1ΠT = bT−1UT + ET−1 [bT |bT−1 = 0]UT + (1− ET−1 [bT |bT−1 = 0])ET−1 [mT |bT = 0]
(2.8)
If the individual exits in T −1 (bT−1 = 1), then by definition, he will not be an entrepreneur
in period T . Therefore, the individual will receive UT in the final period. If the individual
does not exit in T − 1, he will exit in period T if the reservation wage in period T exceeds
his best guess of entrepreneurial ability such that UT > mT . However, mT is unknown at
time T − 1. The best guess of ability next period is simply the current estimate of ability,
therefore ET−1 [mT |(bT−1 = 0)] = mT−1. The probability of exit in the terminal period is
calculated as shown:
ET−1 [bT |bT−1 = 0] = Φ
(
UT−mT−1
1/
√
hT
)
(2.9)
where Φ(·) is the normal cumulative distribution function. Since precision increases by a
constant amount each period, hT is known at T − 1.
Moreover, if the entrepreneur does not exit in period T , it is likely that the entrepreneur
received favorable revenue in T − 1. This indicates that entrepreneurial ability is high and
the expectation of revenue in the final period should be high. The updated expectation
can be calculated using Bayesian inference. Let pi(θ) represent the prior distribution such
that pi(θ) ∼ N (mT−1, 1hT−1 ). The new information, bT = 0, implies that mT ≥ UT .9 This
new information is denoted by E. The probability of observing E for a given value of θ is
represented by l(E|θ). The posterior distribution is formed as follows:
f(θ|E) = pi(θ)l(E|θ)∫
pi(θ)l(E|θ)dθ (2.10)
I approximate this discretely with the help of a Python package from Downey (2011).
The mean of the posterior distribution is ET−1 [mT |bT = 0] .
Given a set of base parameters, it is possible to numerically solve for the optimal choice
of bT−1. By simulating the model using many different values of of mT−1, I am able to
9This is only true in the final period. Since, there is no value in acquire more information about
unobserved ability the maximization problem is simplified.
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calculate the minimum value of mT−1 for which the entrepreneur will stay self-employed
denoted by mminT−1. For convenience, I will refer to this as the ability threshold. Using
backwards induction, it is possible to solve for mmint all the way back to the first period. I
assume that entrants into self-employment do so at the margin. In other words, entrants
have an m1 that is just slightly larger than m
min
1 . This assumption is later relaxed and
explored further.
After working backwards to solve for all mmint , I work forward to calculate the survival
function of marginal entrants. By design, for all entrants, m1 > m
min
1 . Therefore, the
probability of exit for all individuals is 0 in the first period. In the first period, some entrants
receive low earnings and revise their new estimate of ability, m2, downward. Probability of
exit in period two is as shown:
p(b2 = 1) = Φ
(
mmin2 −m2
1/
√
h2
)
(2.11)
where Φ(·) is the normal cumulative distribution function. Finally, entrepreneurs who sur-
vive period two are of higher ability than average. This means that the average ability of
entrepreneurs, mt, is increasing through time. Conversely, the probability of exit, condi-
tional on surviving thus far, is falling through time. The probability of exiting in period
three is given by:
p(b3 = 1) = Φ
(
mmin3 − E(m3|b2 = 0)
1/
√
h3
)
(2.12)
Bayesian inference is used to calculate, E(m3|b2 = 1), which accounts for the impact of
survival on mean ability. This equation can be generalized to solve for the probability
of exit in t = 4 . . .T. Given the exit probabilities, it is straightforward to generate the
population cumulative survival function. The survival functions generated by the model
will later be compared visually to survival functions generated by the data.
To quantitatively make comparisons between the theoretical and empirical models it is
useful to generate hazard rates. The hazard rate, ht, is the probability an individual will
exit in period t, conditional on surviving through period t − 1. It is the complement of
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Table 2.1: Baseline Parameters
Parameter Description Value
U Wage possible in paid employment 50.0
β Discount factor .95
T Number of periods 20
σα Standard deviation of ability 69
σ Standard deviation of earnings noise 51
C First period sunk cost 5
the slope of the survival function. Let pcst denote the cumulative probability of survival in
period t. The hazard rate in period t is defined as:
h(t) =
pcst−1 − pcst
pcst−1
(2.13)
By comparing the hazard rates of two models that differ by only one variable, it is possible
to quantify the marginal impact of a variable on exit. These comparisons are known as
hazard ratios.
2.2.4 Baseline Model Predictions
The model is not calibrated to match key statistics. Rather, it is used to gain intuition about
the behavior of entrepreneurs and to generate testable predictions of this behavior. To make
these predictions, it is necessary to start with some baseline parameters. The parameters in
the baseline model and their chosen values are shown in Table 2.1. The discount factor (β),
the number of periods (T ) and the first period sunk costs (C) do not affect the dynamics
of the model and are chosen arbitrarily.10 Entry and exit decisions depend primarily on the
standard deviation of entrepreneurial ability (σα) and the standard deviation of earnings
noise (σ). These parameters are based on empirical summary statistics from the 1996
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The outside wage is arbitrarily chosen
to be 50 and the standard deviations are normalized relative to it.
The minimum estimate of ability (mmint ) that an individual must have to rationally
10I considered using data on business capital to inform the measure of sunk costs, but it is impossible to
know what portion of capital investments are sunk.
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continue in self-employment is graphed through time in Figure 2.2. The mmin1 to enter self-
employment is 45.26. Since the outside wage, U , equals 50, this means that individuals will
knowingly enter self-employment even though they expect their self-employment earnings
to be less, on average, than what they would have earned in paid-employment.11 This is
rational because the information individuals obtain about their entrepreneurial ability is
very valuable. If entrepreneurial ability is revealed to be low, an individual can cut his
losses incurring only the sunk cost of entry and the opportunity cost of having forgone more
lucrative paid work. However, if entrepreneurial ability is revealed to be high, the individual
will enjoy earnings higher than U for the rest of his career.
Figure 2.2: Baseline Model: Minimum Required Estimate of Ability
After entry, mmint drops precipitously. Because the sunk costs of entry have been in-
curred, the marginal cost of seeing another period of earnings information is now lower.
In the subsequent periods, the mmin function is initially concave capturing the diminishing
marginal informational value of another period of earnings data. However, a countervail-
ing force eventually causes the mmint function to become convex. As time passes and the
11This could help explain the self-employment wage penalty that is consistently found in the literature.
A cross-sectional snapshot will make it appear as though the self-employed are earning less. However, this
would not necessarily be the case if the researcher was able to view lifetime earnings.
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individual nears the terminal period, the value of information about entrepreneurial ability
declines. In the final period, T , there is no value to learning about entrepreneurial ability
because there is no future. Therefore, mminT = U . This force makes the m
min
t function
convex because the percentage decline in the future is increasing in magnitude over time.12
Figure 2.3: Baseline Model: Probability of Surviving Through Period t
Figure 2.3 shows the probability an entrant will survive through period t. As before,
entrants are marginal such that m1 ≈ mmin1 ≈ 45.26. By definition, all entrants survive the
first period and the probability of survival strictly falls through time. In the baseline model,
almost half of the entrants exit after seeing one period of earnings data. This steep decline is
driven by the parameters σ and σα. The larger the variation within an individual’s earnings,
the less informative earnings become, decreasing the likelihood of exit. The higher the vari-
ation in earnings across entrepreneurs the lower the average ability level of entrants. Since
entrants are marginal, their average entrepreneurial ability is below the population average.
It is therefore not surprising that most entrants lose the “entrepreneurial lottery.” Infor-
mative earnings allow entrants to recognize this quickly. The surviving entrepreneurs have
higher ability and the marginal informational value of new earnings is decreasing with time.
12From t=16 to t=17 the number of periods in the future goes from 4 to 3, a 25% reduction. From t=17
to t=18 the number of periods in the future goes from 3 to 2, a 33.3% reduction.
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This causes the survival function to flatten rather rapidly. As the entrepreneur approaches
the final period, the ability threshold rises rapidly and the survival rate plummets. Empir-
ically, this effect will be less pronounced as entrepreneurs have a career that is indefinite
rather than finite in length.
2.2.5 Variations to the Baseline Model
While the baseline model is quite informative, further insights are possible by varying the
parameters. In particular, I explore the consequences of varying the time frame (T), the sunk
costs (C), the variation of entrepreneurial ability in the population (σα) and the variation
in the error component of earnings (σ). The implications are as follows:
Figure 2.4: Baseline Model: mmint as T varies
1. As the time frame increases, the ability threshold, mmint , falls. This is because a longer
future increases the lifetime value of being self-employed if entrepreneurial ability is
revealed to be high. This is illustrated in Figure 2.4. It should be noted that in
the first few periods the minimum ability threshold seems to be nearly identical in
all specifications. The curves only diverge as t increases. Intuitively, when the future
consists of just a few periods, the potential entrant must consider both whether he has
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Figure 2.5: Relationship Between Sunk Costs and Survival
a comparative advantage in entrepreneurship and whether the future is long enough
to recoup the cost of entry. As T increases, the problem quickly simplifies to whether
the individual expects entrepreneurial ability to exceed the outside wage, expressed as
Et(α > U).
2. As first-period sunk costs increase, mmin1 must rise. This is because it becomes more
costly for low-ability workers to enter self-employment as a long-shot gamble. How-
ever, because the costs are sunk, they have no effect on mmint after entry. Sunk costs
do, however, increase the average ability of entrants. Therefore sunk costs are pos-
itively correlated with survival rates. At extremely high levels of sunk costs, only
very high ability workers will enter the market and subsequent exits will be virtually
non-existent. This is illustrated in Figure 2.5.
3. As the standard deviation of the error component of earnings, σ, increases, m
min
t falls.
This is illustrated in Figure 2.6. This happens because as σ increases, earnings become
less informative indicators of ability. Therefore, an individual’s estimate of ability has
less precision. With perfect precision, an individual will only enter self-employment if
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Figure 2.6: Relationship of Within Variation and Ability Threshold
m1 > 50, that is, if self-employment pays more than the outside wage. However, as
guesses of ability become less precise, low estimates of ability are increasingly likely
to be due to chance.
4. As the standard deviation of entrepreneurial ability in the population, σα, increases,
mmint must fall. This is true because as σα rises, the probability that a given individual
has exceptional entrepreneur ability increases. It is also true that the probability a
given individual will fail miserably increases. However, these entrepreneurs can cut
their losses quickly and go back to paid employment. Successful entrepreneurs will
enjoy a premium income until period T. A high σα, increases the potential gains of
entrepreneurship without increasing the potential losses. Therefore, σα is inversely
correlated with mmint . This is shown in Figure 2.7 where the baseline level of σα is
varied by 50 percent in either direction.
2.2.6 Duration Puzzle
As noted before, there is empirical evidence that the unemployed have shorter self-employment
durations than average. The goal of the model is to provide a theoretical explanation for
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Figure 2.7: Relationship of Between Variation and Ability Threshold
this puzzle. I begin by ruling out two possible explanations.
Differences in innate ability cannot explain the duration puzzle. At first glance,
it might appear that differences in ability are responsible for the duration puzzle. It is quite
plausible that the unemployed are, on average, of lower ability than employed workers. In
this case, it seems natural that lower ability individuals would fail more quickly at self-
employment. However, low ability individuals also would earn a lower outside wage in the
traditional labor market. In fact, the entrepreneurial ability of marginal entrants is derived
in the model from the outside wage. The impact of these two opposing forces should cancel
each other out.
Consider a deviation from the baseline model where two types of workers are considering
self-employment. Low ability workers have an outside wage U = 50. Given the parameters
of the baseline model, marginal low ability entrants will have a mean estimated innate
ability of m1 = 45.26. High ability workers have outside wage that is 10 percent higher, so
U = 55. Given the parameters of the baseline model, marginal high ability entrants will
have a mean estimated innate ability of m1 = 50.26. The impact on m
min
t is shown in Figure
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Figure 2.8: Relationship Between Outside Wage and Ability Threshold
2.8. High ability individuals face a higher mmint than low ability individuals. However, high
ability entrants have higher entrepreneurial ability and earn higher entrepreneurial earnings.
Therefore, survival rates are identical between the two groups as shown in Figure 2.9.13
Relaxing the assumption of marginal entry cannot explain the duration puzzle.
One of the assumptions of the model is that entrants to self-employment do so at the margin.
This means that entrants are indifferent between entering self-employment and receiving the
outside wage. The justification for this assumption is that any entrants for whom entry was
particularly attractive would already have entered in prior periods. However, in the case
of the unemployed, this assumption is less tenable. Some subset of the unemployed who
enter self-employment do so after receiving a shock to their outside wage, U . A negative
shock to U in the last period could induce an individual to enter self-employment. For this
individual, it is likely that m1 > m
min
1 .
To explore the consequences of this possibility, it is useful to compare the survival rates
of workers who do and do not enter at the margin. Consider the baseline model where
13This is true after scaling up the variation and sunk cost parameters by 10 percent. Remaining differences
in the survival functions are merely the result of rounding errors in the discrete approximation.
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Figure 2.9: Relationship Between Outside Wage and Survival
normal workers have an outside wage of 50 and enter at the margin. This implies that m1 =
mmin1 = 45.26. In addition, suppose that a group of unemployed workers received a wage of
55 last period. Now that they have lost their jobs, the outside wage they could receive if
they take a new job this period is only 50. For these workers, m1 > [m
min
1 (U = 50) = 45.26].
However, since these workers did not enter self-employment last period, it is known that
m1 < [m
min
0 (U = 55) = 50.26]. So, for the marginal entrant m1 = 45.26 but for the non-
marginal entrant 45.26 < m1 < 50.26. Relaxing the assumption of marginal entry increases
the average ability of entrants while leaving the ability threshold unchanged. Therefore,
non-marginal entrants should have even higher survival rates, contrary to the duration
puzzle. This is illustrated in Figure 2.10 when the mean estimate of ability for non-marginal
entrants is chosen to be mmin1 = 47.76 (the midpoint between m
min
1 (U = 50) = 45.26 and
mmin1 (U = 55) = 50.26).
2.2.7 Overconfidence
The model shows that movements into and out of self-employment are driven by imper-
fect information. In a world with perfect information no one would exit self-employment.
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Figure 2.10: Relationship Between Marginal Entry and Survival
Individuals with low entrepreneurial ability would never enter and those with high en-
trepreneurial ability would never leave. Survival rates, therefore, depend primarily on the
evolution of information over time. Up until this point, I have assumed that individuals
have rational expectations about their ability. In other words, individuals have accurate
information about the distribution of entrepreneurial ability and earnings. However, if in-
dividuals are systematically biased in their expectations, it will substantially affect survival
rates. In particular, individuals who overestimate their entrepreneurial ability will be more
likely to exit self-employment.
To illustrate this, consider the baseline model where the outside wage is 50. Suppose
there are two groups: rational individuals and overconfident individuals. Rational individ-
uals have an accurate assessment of the distribution of their entrepreneurial ability. Over-
confident individuals believe that their mean entrepreneurial ability is 1 percent higher
than what a rational person would believe. Therefore, an overconfident individual with the
background to justify an expected entrepreneurial ability of 50 would actually believe his
expected entrepreneurial ability to be 50.5. In the model, this overconfidence is captured
by γ = 1.01 where m1 = γE1[α]. Overconfidence only affects initial estimates of ability.
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Overconfident individuals still rationally update their estimate of ability after seeing their
entrepreneurial earnings.
Since the two groups have the same U , σα, and σ both groups will have the same ability
threshold through time. In the first period, mmin1 = 45.26. For rational individuals, E1[α]
must exceed 45.26 to make self-employment attractive. For an overconfident individual,
γE1[α] must exceed 45.26. In the case of γ = 1.01 an E1[α] of 44.82 would be sufficient for
entry. The effect of overconfidence is to decrease the true ability of marginal entrants while
leaving the perceived ability constant across both groups. Following entry, individuals in
the overconfident group will be more likely to receive lower than expected earnings. This
will cause them to revise their estimates of ability downward and a disproportional number
of them will exit self-employment. This is illustrated in Figure 2.11.
Figure 2.11: Relationship Between Overconfidence and Survival
It is quite clear from Figure 2.11 that overconfident individuals are more likely to exit
entrepreneurship. What is less apparent visually is that the effect of overconfidence on
survival is changing over time. To see this, it is useful to compare the hazard rate of
overconfident individuals to the hazard rate of rational individuals. The hazard rates are
calculated as described in Equation 2.13. Since overconfident individuals are of lower ability,
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they tend to see lower earnings than rational individuals. The more periods of low earnings
they see, the more likely they will be to revise their estimates of ability downward enough
to exit the market. This causes the hazard rate to increase with time. Eventually, however,
all the overconfident individuals who should have exited will have already done so. In other
words, overconfidence makes marginal workers more likely to exit, but it does not have much
of an effect on high ability workers. Together, these two forces result in a concave hazard
ratio as shown in Figure 2.12. Amazingly after 5 months, individuals in the baseline model
that overestimate their ability by just 1 percent are twice as likely to exit self-employment.
Figure 2.12: Hazard Rate of Overconfident/Hazard Rate of Rational
2.3 Empirical Work
In this section, I replicate the duration puzzle finding that the formerly unemployed are
more likely to exit self-employment. Then, I provide some preliminary evidence to support
the hypothesis that overconfidence is responsible for the duration puzzle.
59
2.3.1 Data
To achieve these aims, I use pooled data from the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP is well-suited to study transitions
of the unemployed into self-employment. Most importantly, the SIPP surveys respondents
quarterly and asks them to provide information about each of the last 4 months. This results
in monthly observations, a critical property since the average duration of self-employment is
quite short. Another advantage of the SIPP is its large size. In the 1996 SIPP, over 40,000
households are interviewed quarterly from 1996-2000. Individuals in the 2001 SIPP are in-
terviewed from 2000-2003. Together, this generates over 5 million monthly observations of
working-age individuals. Because unemployment and self-employment entry are relatively
rare, a large data set is necessary for statistically significant estimates. The main disadvan-
tage of the SIPP is that it does not contain much background information on respondents.
It would be ideal to have measures of innate ability such as IQ in order to compare the
ability of those individuals who enter self-employment from unemployment to those who do
not. In the absence of this information, I use education as an imperfect proxy of ability.
The SIPP specifically asks respondents about their employment status. This makes it
possible to accurately determine spells of joblessness without having to make inferences from
less reliable variables such as income. Official statistics require individuals to be actively
seeking work to be considered unemployed. I do not make this distinction for two reasons.
While the SIPP collects some data on job searching, relative to macroeconomic statistics,
it appears to be missing a large number of individuals looking for work. Moreover, I’m only
studying individuals who move from unemployment to self-employment. These individuals
are revealing themselves to be members of the labor force. Whether they were actively
searching for jobs prior to entering self-employment is of little consequence. To focus on
individuals in the labor market, I exclude minors and people attending school.
I generate a dummy to capture whether an individual was unemployed in the month
prior to self-employment. In addition, I create the variable T imeUnemployed to measure
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Table 2.2: Differences Between Entering and Incumbent Entrepreneurs
Entrant Incumbent Difference T-Value
Education (years) 13.60 13.90 -0.30 -24.66
High School (%) 0.29 0.29 0.00 -0.19
Some College (%) 0.29 0.27 0.02 9.08
College (%) 0.19 0.20 -0.01 -8.47
Graduate (%) 0.12 0.15 -0.03 -17.43
Married (%) 0.73 0.76 -0.03 -14.95
Age (years) 46.59 46.51 0.08 1.62
Male (%) 0.66 0.74 -0.08 -41.29
Black (%) 0.05 0.04 0.01 14.11
Hispanic (%) 0.08 0.06 0.02 20.54
Incorporated (%) 0.26 0.39 -0.12 -63.05
Monthly Income ($) $3,276.97 $4,192.18 -$915.21 -$38.78
Hourly Wage ($) $23.37 $25.86 -$2.50 -$7.59
Weekly Hours 43.05 47.54 -4.49 -60.24
the cumulative time an individual has been unemployed. After, a spell of employment or
self-employment, cumulative unemployment is reset to zero.
2.3.2 Summary Statistics
Since I am interested in the job market status of individuals prior to their self-employment
spell, I restrict the duration analysis to individuals who are observed to enter self-employment
during the panel. This means an individual who enters the panel self-employed and leaves
the panel self-employed would not be observed in my analysis. Due to selection effects,
entrants to self-employment are of lower quality then incumbents. Entrants tend to have
less education and earn lower incomes. The differences between the two groups of en-
trepreneurs are shown in Table 2.2. Because of these differences, summary statistics about
self-employed entrants should not be considered to be representative of the self-employed as
a whole. Rather, the following results are suggestive for an important slice of entrepreneurs:
those who are just starting out. In this panel, entrants compose 60.1 percent of all self-
employment observations.
The theoretical model shows that self-employment duration is a function of variation in
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Table 2.3: Variation in Income During Self-employment
Unemployed at Entry Typical Entrant All Entrants
Mean Income $2,333 $3,548 $3,106
Overall Standard Deviation 3,840 5,531 5,016
Within Standard Deviation 2,047 3,097 2,761
Between Standard Deviation 3,225 4,284 3,897
# of Individuals 2,092 2,824 4,910
ability across individuals and within an individual’s earnings. These variables are approx-
imated by the within and between standard deviations of income as shown in Table 2.3.14
Not surprisingly, individuals who enter self-employment from unemployment have lower av-
erage earnings. However, relative to income, the within and between variation are of the
same magnitude for both groups. This is encouraging as it indicates that neither differences
in the distribution of ability nor the level of earnings noise between groups are responsible
for the duration puzzle.
When individuals exit self-employment, they are asked to report the reason for their
departure. Of the 5,788 entrants to self-employment observed during the panel, 4,584 exited
and reported the reason for leaving self-employment. Their answers are shown in Table 2.4.
About 12 percent of exits were the result of business failure. That is not much higher than
the 9.1 percent that retired. In contrast, 25.4 percent of respondents quit to take another
job.15 These results are consistent with the theoretical model where self-employment exit is
driven by the opportunity cost of being self-employed and is not modeling business failure
per se.
Of the 5,788 entrants to self-employment, 2,531 are unemployed prior to entry. Con-
sistent with the literature, the unemployed are more likely to enter self-employment. On
average, about 1.4 percent of individuals who are not currently self-employed will enter
14Formerly unemployed and typical individuals do not sum to the total for “All” because a few individuals
have multiple spells of unemployment and fit in both categories. Also, income totals do not match summary
statistics totals because some individuals have missing values for income.
15The actual question in the SIPP is quit to “To start other business/take job,” but I restrict respondents
to those who are no longer self employed.
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Table 2.4: Reasons for Leaving Self-employment
Reason # Responses % of Responses
Retirement or old age 419 9.1%
Childcare problems 42 0.9%
Other family/personal problems 359 7.8%
Own illness 192 4.2%
Own injury 55 1.2%
School/training 29 0.6%
Went bankrupt/business failed 550 12.0%
Sold business or transferred 271 5.9%
To take a job 1,164 25.4%
Season ended for a seasonal 204 4.5%
Quit for some other reason 1,299 28.3%
Total 4,584 100.0%
self-employment in the next 12 months. Using a probit model I find that unemployed work-
ers are 26.2 percent more likely to enter self-employment. The full results are available in
Appendix B.1. This finding suggests that unemployed workers may not be entering at the
margin. Which, as noted in the theory section, only makes their shorter survival times in
self-employment more puzzling.
Finally, it is informative to contrast the differences between the unemployed and em-
ployed as they transition into self-employment. Theory predicts that entrants with lower
outside wages will have lower innate ability. While the SIPP does not contain a measure
of innate ability, education at entry and income during duration are informative signals of
innate ability. The differences in ability and other background variables at entry can be
seen in Table 2.5. Entrants transitioning from unemployment have less education, are more
likely to be female, are less likely to be married, and are more likely to be a minority. The
formerly unemployed are 2.3 years younger, on average, at entry.
Following entry, the formerly unemployed underperform relative to former employees.
These differences are shown in Table 2.6. The formerly unemployed bring home 962 fewer
dollars each month relative to their employee counterparts. Only 19 percent of their busi-
nesses are incorporated compared to 28 percent for former employees. They also work fewer
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Table 2.5: Differences at Entry by Prior Job Status
Unemployed Employed Difference T-Value
Education (years) 13.20 13.80 -0.59 -32.56
High School (%) 0.32 0.29 0.03 11.84
Some College (%) 0.28 0.28 0.00 -0.37
College (%) 0.16 0.20 -0.04 -15.59
Graduate School (%) 0.10 0.14 -0.04 -21.84
Married (%) 0.67 0.75 -0.08 -28.74
Age (years) 44.51 46.85 -2.34 -28.15
Male (%) 0.60 0.71 -0.11 -37.61
Black (%) 0.08 0.04 0.03 20.65
Hispanic (%) 0.13 0.07 0.06 31.58
Individuals Entering 2,531 3,257
Table 2.6: Differences in Self-employment Outcomes by Prior Job Status
Unemployed Employed Difference T-Value
Monthly Income ($) $2,509.06 $3,470.83 -$961.78 -31.72
Hourly Wage ($) $22.57 $23.57 -$1.00 -1.85
Weekly Hours 38.48 44.20 -5.72 -46.17
Incorporated (%) 0.19 0.28 -0.10 -35.57
Average Duration (months) 8.0 9.4 -1.47
Individuals Entering 2,531 3,257
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hours each week. These results are not particularly surprising. Since the unemployed are
of lower ability they should earn lower wages. However, according to the predictions of
the model, they should not exit self-employment prematurely. Yet, they do. The average
duration of self-employment is 8.0 months for individuals who were previously self-employed
and 9.4 months for regular workers.16 Consistent with the literature, it appears that the
formerly unemployed do not survive as long in self-employment. To show that this differ-
ence is statistically significant and explore whether it can be explained by overconfidence
will require a more formal approach.
2.3.3 Methodology
While the average duration of self-employment is informative, it is useful to see how survival
rates vary through time. To accomplish this, I employ the Kaplan-Meier Curve. Let S(t)
be the probability that a self-employed entrant will survive to period t. In each time period
ti the number of “at risk” individuals is denoted by ni and the number of exits (or deaths)
is denoted by di. The Kaplan-Meier estimator is the nonparametric maximum likelihood
estimate of S(t) as follows:
Sˆ(t) =
∏
ti<t
ni − di
ni
(2.14)
One of the benefits of the Kaplan-Meier Curve is that it is not biased by censoring as ni sim-
ply diminishes if individuals drop out of the panel. To illustrate the duration puzzle, I create
separate Kaplan-Meier curves for the formerly unemployed and employed and compare them
using the log-rank test.
It is likely that variables correlated to unemployment, rather than unemployment itself,
are influencing survival. These variables are denoted by vector X. To isolate the effect
of unemployment on survival, I use the Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972). As
with all hazard models, the hazard rate, h(t,X), gives the probability of exit in period t
16These durations may seem short. That is because they are downward biased due to censoring when the
panel ends (after 4 or 3 years depending on the panel).
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conditional on surviving so far. For a discrete duration random variable T :
h(t) =
Pr(T = t)
Pr(T ≥ t) (2.15)
In a proportional hazards model, it is assumed that part of the hazard rate is constant across
all individuals and is solely a function of time. This is referred to as the underlying hazard
function, λ(t). It captures how the hazard changes over time as other variables are held
constant. This causes the effect of variables to be multiplicatively related to the underlying
hazard function. For example, if being male increases the rate of hazard by 10 percent in
the first period, it should also increase the rate of hazard by 10 percent in the second period
and all subsequent periods. The distinctive feature of the Cox model is that the effect
of variables on the hazard rate can be estimated without having to specify the underlying
hazard function. For this reason, the Cox model is considered to be a semiparimetric model.
For a vector of variables X, the hazard function for the Cox model is given by:
h(t,X) = λ(t)eX
′β (2.16)
The parameters of the model can be estimated using partial maximum likelihood estimation.
Let ti denote the time period entrepreneur i is observed to exit given that ti is one of
r observed exit times {t(1), t(2), · · · , t(r)}. Self-employment duration is right censored for
individuals who are still self-employed when the survey ends. The partial likelihood function
is:
L(β) =
n∏
i=1
[
eX
′
iβ∑
tj≥ti e
X′
j
β
]δi
(2.17)
where δi = 0 if i is right censored and δi = 1 otherwise.
The log of the above function is maximized using standard maximum likelihood tech-
niques to estimate the parameters. The model is solved using the Stata package stcox and
ties are handled using Breslow’s method (Breslow, 1975).
I run two specifications of the model. First, I seek to confirm the duration puzzle
by showing that unemployment is responsible for shorter self-employment durations after
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controlling for all possible variables. To achieve this aim, the chosen variables in the first
specification of the model are as follows:
X ′β = Demographics′β1 + Education
′β2 + β3Unemployed (2.18)
Demographics includes age, gender, race, marital status, and region. Education includes
dummies for high school through graduate school. Unemployed is a dummy equal to 1 if
an individual was unemployed prior to entering self-employment. If the unemployed exit
self-employment early then β3 < 0.
The second objective is to test the hypothesis that the self-employed are overconfident.
It would be ideal to ask the unemployed and employed at entry their expected chances of
success and test the accuracy of their predictions. Lacking this data, I look for evidence
consistent with overconfidence by the unemployed. The model simulations predict that
the hazard ratio of unemployment should be time dependent. In the simulated model, the
hazard ratio initially increases with time before hitting a maximum and decreasing. I test
for this phenomena by interacting self-employment duration with a dummy for formerly
unemployed. I also include the square of this variable.
Additionally, I test whether the length of unemployment duration affects the hazard rate
in self-employment. In other words, are people who are unemployed for a long period of
time less likely to exit self-employment? If overconfidence is responsible for the duration
puzzle then there are a few reasons that unemployment duration might reduce confidence. As
unemployment duration increases, the literature indicates that people become less optimistic
and have reduced self-esteem. The psychological costs of unemployment might counteract
initial overconfidence. Moreover, as time goes on the unemployed will search for jobs, receive
job offers, and receive better feedback about their value in the marketplace. This may give
them a clearer view of their innate ability. As a result, it should reduce initial biases formed
if the unemployed do not accurately recognize the firm-specific component of past wages
when making inferences about their current market value. I test both of these predictions
using the following specification:
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X ′β = Demographics′β1 + Education
′β2 + β3Unemployed
+β4T imeUnemployed+ β5T imeUnemployed
2
+β6Unemployed ∗ SelfDuration+ β7(Unemployed ∗ SelfDuration)2
(2.19)
SelfDuration is the amount of time the entrant has survived in self-employment. If indi-
viduals eventually become less overconfident the longer they are unemployed then β4 < 0.
If self-employment duration affects overconfidence in a concave fashion as described earlier
then β6 > 0 and β7 < 0.
2.3.4 Results
The Kaplan-Meir survival curves for both groups are shown in Figure 2.13. Visually, the
shape of both survival curves is consistent with the theoretical model. Survival probability
initially drops sharply before leveling off. In terms of magnitude, slightly fewer entrepreneurs
survive empirically than theory predicts. But, that is not surprising given the admittedly
rough estimates of parameters. Most importantly, the survival rate of the formerly unem-
ployed is much lower than that of the formerly employed. Over time, the survival rates
appear to diverge at a decreasing rate. Using the log-rank test, the difference between the
two curves is statistically significant at a 99 percent confidence level.
The results from both specifications of the Cox model are shown in Table 2.7. To aid in
interpretation, the estimates are shown both as coefficients and hazard ratios. The hazard
ratio is the exponent of the estimated coefficient. It is interpreted as the hazard rate if the
variable increases by one unit, divided by the baseline hazard rate. For example, the hazard
ratio onMale is .80 in the second specification. This means that the hazard rate of someone
who is male is .80 percent the size of the hazard rate of a female. So, men are less likely to
exit self-employment than women. The effects of the variables are largely consistent across
the two specifications. Older people, men, and those living in metropolitan areas are less
likely to exit self-employment. College completion does not have a statistically significant
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Figure 2.13: Kaplan-Meier Self-employment Survival Estimates
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impact on the hazard rate. People in Western states are more likely to exit entrepreneurship.
This may be because there is less stigma associated with business failure in the West.
The first specification confirms the duration paradox. After controlling for other vari-
ables, the unemployed are 27.5 percent more likely to exit from self-employment. This
effect is statistically significant at the 99 percent level. This confirms that, as in many other
European countries, unemployed workers in the United States are less likely to survive in
self-employment.
The second specification shows that the effect of unemployment on the hazard ratio
initially increases, peaks and then decreases. Self-employment duration amplifies the hazard
rate of unemployment while self-employment duration squared decreases the hazard rate.
To interpret the net effect of these forces, I calculate the combined impact on the hazard
ratio and graph the results in Figure 2.14. The hazard ratio peaks at 1.6 after 18 months
of self-employment. This means that after 18 months of being self-employed, formerly
unemployed workers are 60 percent more likely to exit self-employment than an otherwise
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Table 2.7: Results from the Cox Model
Specification 1 Specification 2
Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Age 0.955 -0.046 0.954 -0.048
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.807 -0.215 0.799 -0.224
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Black 0.948 -0.053 0.954 -0.047
(0.386) (0.386) (0.445) (0.445)
Hispanic 0.904 -0.101 0.908 -0.096
(0.043) (0.043) (0.056) (0.056)
High School 0.877 -0.132 0.878 -0.130
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Some College 0.948 -0.054 0.946 -0.055
(0.285) (0.285) (0.274) (0.274)
College 1.045 0.044 1.045 0.044
(0.431) (0.431) (0.428) (0.428)
Graduate 0.965 -0.036 0.963 -0.038
(0.585) (0.585) (0.563) (0.563)
Married 1.007 0.007 1.005 0.005
(0.826) (0.826) (0.874) (0.874)
Metro 0.896 -0.110 0.898 -0.108
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
North East 0.954 -0.047 0.956 -0.045
(0.330) (0.330) (0.353) (0.353)
North Central 1.026 0.026 1.027 0.027
(0.538) (0.538) (0.522) (0.522)
West 1.129 0.121 1.129 0.122
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Unemployed Dummy 1.275 0.243 1.194 0.178
(0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.018)
Time Unemployed 0.982 -0.018
(0.043) (0.043)
(Time Unemployed)2 1.000 0.000
(0.123) (0.123)
Unemployed X Self Duration 1.038 0.037
(0.007) (0.007)
(Unemployed X Self Duration)2 0.999 -0.001
(0.024) (0.024)
N. of Observations 44,447 44,447 44,447 44,447
N. of Subjects 5,387 5,387 5,387 5,387
N. of Failures 3,589 3,589 3,589 3,589
Time at Risk 46,644 46,644 46,644 46,644
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Figure 2.14: Effect of Self-employment Duration on the Unemployment Hazard Ratio
identical individual who was employed prior to entry. The evolution of the hazard ratio
over time is consistent with the behavior of the overconfident individuals in the theoretical
model. While not conclusive, this provides some evidence that overconfidence is responsible
for the diminished survival of the unemployed.
The specification also shows that individuals unemployed for longer periods of time are
more likely to survive in unemployment. Each period of unemployment duration reduces the
hazard rate by 1.2 percent. However, for most unemployed individuals, this negative effect
is dominated by the positive effect of the unemployment dummy variable for all but the
longest unemployment durations. Someone would have to be unemployed for over 2 years
before the net effect of unemployment on hazard was negative. This result is consistent with
long-term unemployment reducing irrational exuberance and helping individuals to gain a
better understanding of their value in the marketplace.
71
2.4 Robustness
The Cox model is a semiparametric model because it leaves the baseline hazard function,
h(t), unspecified. This is appropriate since there is not an a priori reason to expect the
hazard function to be of a certain functional form.17 However, to check the robustness of
my results, I compare my findings against two parametric proportional hazards models that
specify the functional form of h(t). In the Weibull proportional hazards model, the hazard
function is specified as:
h(t) = αλαtα−1
If α > 1 then h(t) is monotonically increasing through time. If α < 1 then h(t) is
monotonically decreasing through time. In the special case where α = 1, the hazard function
reduces to h(t) = λ. In this case, h(t) is constant through time and this model is known as
the exponential proportional hazards model.
I rerun Specification 2 using each of these proportional hazards models. The results are
shown in Appendix B.2. The alternative models find even stronger evidence of the duration
puzzle. In Specification 2 of the Cox model, the unemployed are 19.4 percent more likely to
exit self-employment. Whereas in the Weibull model, the formerly unemployed are 2.1 times
more likely to exit self-employment and in the exponential model they are 1.9 times more
likely to exit. This indicates that the original analysis, if anything, understates the size of
the duration puzzle. In contrast, the demographic variables are quite consistent across the
three models. It appears that the effect of prior unemployment on the hazard rate may be
related to time in ways that the other variables are not. In addition, the original analysis
indicates that individuals who enter self-employment after a long period of unemployment
are less likely to exit self-employment. This result is robust to both alternative models,
changing only slightly in magnitude.
Finally, the original analysis finds the effect of prior unemployment on hazard to vary
17In contrast, in medical applications this may not be true. A medical researcher may expect a drug to
impact survival during a certain period. For example, a drug may not have any effect if it is administered
too early or after a disease has progressed too far.
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with time as shown in Figure 2.14. This result is not fully confirmed by the alternative
models. While the coefficient on UnemployedXSelfDuration is positive in the Cox model,
it is negative in the Weibull model and insignificant in the exponential model. The effects
of these differences are graphed relative the original model in Appendix B.1. In the alterna-
tive specifications, the effect of unemployment on duration is strictly decreasing with time.
In contrast, in the Cox model, the effect of unemployment on duration initially increases
and then decreases. The alternative models are not showing evidence that overconfident
individuals are, initially, more likely to exit after receiving additional periods of (likely)
disappointing earnings. All three models reflect that eventually the effect of prior unem-
ployment on hazard diminishes. Since the alternative parametric models require the impo-
sition of arbitrary restrictions on the baseline hazard function, I argue that the Cox model
is more reflective of the data. Nevertheless, these alternative specifications show stronger
support for the duration puzzle but somewhat weaker circumstantial evidence consistent
with overconfidence by the formerly unemployed.
2.5 Conclusion
There is a growing body of evidence in European countries that the unemployed who transi-
tion into self-employment do not survive as long as typical entrants. I replicate this finding
using a large United States dataset. Formerly unemployed Americans are 27.5 percent more
likely to exit self-employment in a given period. I explore the implications of this result using
a theoretical model. The model shows that differences in ability between the unemployed
and employees cannot explain differences in self-employment duration. Instead, I suggest
that overconfidence in ability by the unemployed may be responsible for the duration puz-
zle. This hypothesis is informed by evidence in the literature that entrepreneurs as a group
tend to overestimate their abilities. Moreover, work in psychology indicates that low-ability
individuals lack the metacognition to accurately predict their own performance. Since the
unemployed as a group are of lower ability, they should be more prone to overestimate their
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entrepreneurial potential.
While it is impossible to prove that the unemployed overestimate their ability, I find cir-
cumstantial evidence consistent with this theory. The model predicts that the hazard ratio
of overconfident to rational individuals should vary with the time someone is self-employed,
resembling a parabola in shape. This reflects two opposing forces: 1) Overconfident indi-
viduals will be more likely to exit as they receive additional periods of earnings generated
from a distribution of ability that is lower than they realized at entry and 2) As time passes,
low ability workers will exit leaving only high ability workers who are not at the margin of
exiting and for whom overconfidence is inconsequential. This pattern in the hazard ratio is
confirmed empirically using a Cox proportional hazards model. The model shows that less
than 1 percent overconfidence on the part of the unemployed could generate the substantial
hazard ratio seen in the data. Furthermore, I find that the hazard of prior unemployment is
smaller for people who have been unemployed for a long time. I argue that this is consistent
with the psychological aspects of unemployment.
Entrepreneurship and self-employment are often lauded for stimulating economic growth
and generating jobs. Therefore, it is appealing to look to self-employment as a means to
transition displaced workers into working, productive members of society. This would be
ideal if the unemployed were “misfits” better suited to working for themselves. However,
this paper’s findings suggest that governments should be cautious before providing incen-
tives for the unemployed to enter self-employment. In fact, if the unemployed overestimate
their entrepreneurial ability, they should be discouraged from entering self-employment. Un-
necessary spells of self-employment incur sunk costs, reduce work experience and result in
foregone wages. Therefore, subsidizing transitions from unemployment to self-employment
could reduce both individual and societal welfare.
At this point, more research is needed to better understand why the unemployed fail
at entrepreneurship and whether overconfidence is responsible. The stigma of joblessness
may be an alternative explanation for why the unemployed have shorter self-employment
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spells. Additionally, field work in this area would be highly valuable to better understand
the motivations and psychology of the unemployed.
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Table A.1: Fixed Effects Models by Type of Move
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Log hourly wage Voluntary Involuntary Into Self Out of Self
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Age 0.125*** 0.148*** 0.127*** 0.042
(0.009) (0.009) (0.032) (0.030)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High School x Self -0.01 0.147** -0.116* 0.154**
(0.046) (0.053) (0.058) (0.054)
Some College x Self -0.136** 0.259*** 0.032 0
(0.047) (0.056) (0.058) (0.057)
College x Self 0.097 -0.016 -0.039 0.175**
(0.049) (0.064) (0.064) (0.059)
Graduate x Self -0.063 0.013 -0.102 0.11
(0.059) (0.081) (0.077) (0.067)
Self-employed -0.238*** -0.402*** -0.186*** -0.328***
(0.039) (0.044) (0.050) (0.046)
Married -0.043** -0.011 -0.296*** -0.178***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.049) (0.046)
Incorporated 0.057* 0.332*** 0.111*** 0.060*
(0.023) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Job Tenure 0.003*** 0.013*** 0.002 0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Business Tenure 0.005** -0.008** 0.004 0.009**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Disabled -0.046** -0.082*** -0.208*** -0.084
(0.015) (0.012) (0.047) (0.045)
Metropolitan Area 0.036* 0.007 0.159* 0.159*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.063) (0.067)
Northeast 0.105** -0.039 -0.374 -0.658**
(0.038) (0.059) (0.295) (0.243)
North Central 0.062 0.062 -0.063 0.242
(0.034) (0.050) (0.162) (0.136)
West 0.141*** -0.022 0.426* -0.415*
(0.036) (0.046) (0.184) (0.205)
Constant -0.960*** -1.549*** -0.912 1.354*
(0.183) (0.192) (0.701) (0.624)
N. of Observations 67,506 62,888 10,855 12,126
Into Self are individuals who move from a job to self-employment.
Out of Self are individuals who move in the opposite direction.
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Table B.1: Probit Model: Entry into Self-Employment
Marginal Effect Standard Errors %∆ in Entry Probability
Age 0.0014 0.0002 0.0976
Age2 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0010
Black -0.0057 0.0007 -0.4096
Hispanic 0.0006 0.0010 0.0397
Other -0.0005 0.0012 -0.0354
High school 0.0012 0.0009 0.0858
Some college 0.0025 0.0010 0.1788
College 0.0040 0.0012 0.2827
Graduate 0.0061 0.0016 0.4346
Male 0.0081 0.0006 0.5799
Married 0.0038 0.0006 0.2707
Disabled -0.0037 0.0007 -0.2638
Metro -0.0010 0.0006 -0.0746
North East -0.0022 0.0007 -0.1565
North Central -0.0015 0.0007 -0.1100
West 0.0010 0.0007 0.0682
Unemployed 0.0037 0.0011 0.2619
Observations 1,413,182
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Table B.2: Alternative Models for Specification 2
Cox Weibull Exponential
Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Age 0.954 0.939 0.941
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.799 0.763 0.766
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Black 0.954 0.972 0.972
(0.445) (0.695) (0.684)
Hispanic 0.908 0.930 0.929
(0.056) (0.209) (0.197)
Other 1.176 1.206 1.206
(0.018) (0.025) (0.022)
High School 0.878 0.865 0.866
(0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
Some College 0.946 0.928 0.930
(0.274) (0.212) (0.214)
College 1.045 1.031 1.031
(0.428) (0.640) (0.635)
Graduate 0.963 0.950 0.951
(0.563) (0.505) (0.510)
Married 1.005 1.004 1.006
(0.874) (0.914) (0.887)
Metro 0.898 0.873 0.875
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
North East 0.956 0.930 0.934
(0.353) (0.209) (0.224)
North Central 1.027 1.027 1.027
(0.522) (0.594) (0.592)
West 1.129 1.143 1.140
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Unemployed Dummy 1.194 2.100 1.886
(0.018) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Unemployed 0.982 0.976 0.977
(0.043) (0.014) (0.015)
(Time Unemployed)2 1.000 1.001 1.001
(0.123) (0.053) (0.054)
Unemployed X Self Duration 1.038 0.966 0.983
(0.007) (0.005) (0.132)
(Unemployed X Self Duration)2 0.999 0.999 0.999
(0.024) (0.226) (0.036)
N. of Observations 44,447 44,447 44,447
N. of Subjects 5,387 5,387 5,387
N. of Failures 3,589 3,589 3,589
Time at Risk 46,644 46,644 46,644
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